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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Questions 
The European Union has a unique and dynamic legal system, which has shaped itself 
throughout history and continues to develop hand in hand with the economic, societal, cultural, 
and political changes in Europe. Similarly, competition policy has developed in accordance 
with these changes. One element of competition law, which has changed remarkably throughout 
the years, is the role of public policy considerations. A central element to this thesis is to study 
the current goals of EU competition law against its theoretical and economic background and 
contemplate a wider conception of the different goals that competition law could pursue. 
Public policy considerations have had a varying degree of impact in EU competition law. 
Throughout the years, the European Commission has allowed for certain public policy 
considerations, such as the protection of the environment and employment, but “the more 
economic approach” of the early 21st century has marked a turning point in this regard. 
Economic analysis has since the late 1990s become an increasingly important part of 
competition analysis and enforcement1, and the focus on economic parameters has led to a more 
cautious attitude towards public policy interests. Despite the advantages that the more economic 
approach has given to EU competition law, some argue that it has led to an overly price-centric 
approach.2 The Green Deal, together with the rising awareness of climate change, has sparked 
discussion regarding the role of sustainability considerations in competition law.3 Another 
topical concern is the rise of tech giants and the intersection between privacy and competition 
law.4 In addition to specific multidisciplinary interests, some argue that EU competition law 
should hold on to its ordoliberal roots and thus promote societal goals as well.5 
 
1 See the Commission’s White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
paragraph 78, according to which “the Commission will adopt a more economic approach to the application of 
Article 85(1), which will limit the scope of its application to undertakings with a certain degree of market power”. 
See also Van den Bergh 2018, p. 13. 
2 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 92. 
3 See e.g. Volpin 2020, p. 10 and Holmes 2020b, p. 255. 
4 For an insightful analysis of the role of personal data and privacy in competition law, see Maria Wasastjerna’s 
doctoral thesis: Competition, Data and Privacy in the Digital Economy: Testing Conventional Boundaries and 
Expanding Horizons - Towards A Privacy Dimension in Competition Policy? 
5 Gerbrandy 2019, p. 127. 
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Competition policies on a global scale are affected by different underlying economic theories. 
The varying economic and theoretical approaches can be classified into different schools of 
thought. Two large players in the global competition field are the European Union and the 
United States, both representing underlying ideas of different schools of thought.6 Due to their 
differences in competition policy, it is central to this thesis to study the characteristics of the 
European school of thought, especially from the perspective of public policy considerations. 
By analysing the European school and comparing it to the Chicago school, it will be argued 
that competition law in the EU is based on a fundamentally different framework. Furthermore, 
this thesis will contemplate whether the theoretical foundations of the European school of 
thought imply and encourage a more holistic approach to competition law. 
My research question, broadly described, is about the role of public policy considerations in 
EU competition law. The approach is rather theoretical – the idea of public policy 
considerations is analysed from the perspective of the European school of thought and the social 
market economy. More accurately, the purpose of this thesis is to assess public policy 
considerations in light of the European school of thought and its theoretical framework. The 
assessment behind the research question also entails the question of whether competition law 
should be interpreted in an isolated or a holistic manner. In other words, I will study whether 
competition law should be somewhat independent of the totality of EU law, or whether EU-
wide goals and values should be accommodated in competition law as well. I consider this as a 
complementary question embedded in the discussion of public policy considerations. 
What is the current role of public policy considerations in EU competition law, and how do we 
define public policy considerations? It should be noted that the aim of this thesis is not to 
provide a clear-cut definition of public policy considerations. Instead, I have chosen to interpret 
public policy considerations rather widely, in order to assess the research question 
comprehensively. Furthermore, this thesis is not intended to analyse each public policy interest 
in detail, although I will use case law to provide concrete examples and highlight sustainability 
as a recent public policy concern. The research questions are contemplative by nature, and thus 
the aim of this thesis is not to provide a yes-or-no answer. Due to the scope and the theoretical 
approach chosen for this thesis, it is more relevant to study the possibility of public policy 
considerations within the European school’s theoretical framework, i.e. on a more abstract 
level. Under this approach, I will emphasize the fact that competition law is facing more non-
 
6 Hildebrand 2016, p. 6. 
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competition and non-economic interests, and that the theoretical foundations of the European 
school of thought not only allow, but encourage, for considering such interests. 
1.2 Methodology and Sources 
Legal dogmatics is a logical starting point for a methodological approach, as this thesis studies 
current EU competition policy. Legal dogmatics is used to interpret and systematise legal norms 
– to simplify, it studies law currently in force.7 Two distinctions can be made in this regard, as 
legal dogmatics entails a practical and a theoretical approach. The practical approach aims to 
interpret and clarify the meaning of different legal texts.8 The central idea in the theoretical 
approach to legal dogmatics is to develop the general doctrines in a certain area of law. General 
doctrines depict the theoretical core that is discussed within the academic community, and not 
necessarily produced by the legislature or judiciaries. Concepts, principles and theories form 
the essential ingredients of general doctrines. They have multiple functions, one of which is to 
depict the legal order as systematic and consistent.9 
The distinction between the practical and theoretical approach to legal dogmatics is not always 
necessary, as these approaches often complement each other and are intertwined.10 
Furthermore, the theoretical approach may be linked to legal theory, as they often contemplate 
similar questions.11 In this thesis, both the theoretical and practical approach to legal dogmatics 
are necessary in order to assess public policy considerations from the perspective of the 
European school of thought. However, more emphasis is given to the theoretical use of legal 
dogmatics, which is why it is useful and informative to make the distinction between the two 
approaches here. This thesis reflects on fundamental concepts and theories, such as the social 
market economy, consumer welfare, and coherence, and studies the theoretical background of 
EU competition law, namely the European school of thought. 
The study of EU (competition) law should also be given some methodological consideration. 
Raitio emphasizes a contextual approach, which is compatible with the multinational and 
dynamic nature of the EU. For example, legal theory, legal history and political science may 
 
7 Hirvonen 2011, p. 22. 
8 Määttä et al. 2018, p. 20. 
9 Ibid., p. 22. 
10 Ibid., p. 21. 
11 Ibid., p. 24. 
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enrich the research results and provide a deeper understanding of the subject. In addition, 
economic considerations may prove especially useful for research regarding EU competition 
law and the single market.12 Furthermore, many essential concepts of competition law are based 
on competition theory and economics, which might blur the boundaries of competition law as 
a legal subject.13 
My method of choice is legal dogmatics with an emphasis on the theoretical approach. 
Following the contextual approach to EU law, some multidisciplinary notions from legal theory 
and political science are used to provide a more comprehensive analysis. Similarly, economic 
and comparative notions are used in a complementary fashion, to give a more accurate analysis 
of the schools of thought and the differences between them. I believe this approach will provide 
contextual insights and enrich the analysis of the topic. This approach is beneficial to address 
my research question, which is quite contemplative and multidimensional by nature. 
As for the sources used in this thesis, legislation is an essential feature of almost any legal thesis. 
Case law has a central role as well, and this is partly due to the nature of EU competition law. 
EU competition law often includes “open” terminology. The concrete implications of a certain 
concept are usually established in judicial decisions, which is why case law is an especially 
significant source of law. The systematic and teleological method of interpretation in EU law 
views the legal norm in the context of the wider legal system, taking into account the objectives 
of said legal norm.14 Studying the different schools of thought and theoretical concepts, such as 
coherence, requires significant use of legal literature as well. As this topic contemplates on 
questions of competition policy, reports and other policy documents of different institutions of 
the EU and other entities are also relevant sources. 
1.3 Terminology 
Competition law and antitrust law are often used synonymously, mostly so that antitrust law 
refers to American laws and competition law refers to EU competition law. The European 
Commission has also used the word ‘antitrust’ when referring to anticompetitive practices and 
abuse of dominance.15 For the sake of clarity, this thesis has a simple approach: antitrust law is 
 
12 Raitio 2006 p. 815. Kangas represents a somewhat similar approach, as he describes jurisprudence as 
methodologically flexible, being often exposed to multiple methods. See Kangas 1997, p. 91. 
13 Kuoppamäki 2003, p. 23-25. 
14 Ibid., p. 23-25. 
15 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 4. 
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used to refer to American antitrust law, and competition law thus refers to EU competition law 
(and any other competition law regime, if such are mentioned). 
As competition policy is a central theme, it is important to define and use the terminology in a 
logical and clear way. Competition policy is used to refer to the elements that define 
competition law and guide its application and interpretation. To clarify the terminological 
differences, “competition law can be described as the means by which competition policy is 
implemented”.16 
The single market, internal market, and common market, all refer to the EU’s goal of market 
integration. By removing regulatory barriers, EU Member States are intended to form a single 
European market. The underlying idea behind the single European market is often perceived to 
be economic integration, but the single market also entails a social and political dimension.17 
This thesis mainly uses the terms single market and internal market. 
1.4 Structure 
The next chapter is an introduction to EU competition policy and the various objectives 
suggested to EU competition law. Chapter 3 includes brief remarks on the definition of public 
policy considerations, as well as examples from case law. It will also introduce sustainability 
as a recent and noteworthy example of public policy considerations and contemplate on the 
principle of legal certainty. Chapter 4 will introduce the economic and theoretical framework 
central to this thesis, including the different schools of thought and the underlying economic 
theories in competition law. The main focus is on the European school of thought and the 
concept of the social market economy. The chapter will also introduce the Harvard and Chicago 
schools of thought, both of which have affected EU competition law. Chapter 5 studies a central 
issue of this thesis, namely whether competition law should be regarded as an isolated area of 
law, or in light of the wider values and objectives of the European Union. Central to this 
question is chapter 5.1, which studies coherence in competition law. Chapter 5 will also 
combine certain elements of chapters 3 and 4, analysing inter alia consumer well-being and “the 
fair share of the benefits”, as well as the role of economic theories in a society that pursues 
multiple values and objectives. Chapter 6 provides some concluding thoughts on the topic. 
 
16 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 2. 
17 Chalmers - Davies - Monti 2019, p. 626. 
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2 Competition Policy in the European Union 
2.1 Competition in the Founding Treaties 
On a fundamental level, the European Union aims to “promote peace, its values and the well-
being of its peoples.”18 The pursuit of an internal market is described in Article 3(3): “The 
Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological 
advance.” 
Protocol No. 27 of TEU contains the principle of undistorted competition. The Union has 
exclusive competence in competition matters, which means that it has the exclusive right to 
establish “the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market”.19 The 
Treaty provisions relevant to competition include Article 101 (restrictive agreements), Article 
102 (abuse of a dominant position), Article 106 (public undertakings and undertakings with 
special or exclusive rights) and Articles 107 to 109 (unlawful state aid) TFEU. 
For public policy considerations, a relevant Treaty provision is Article 7 TFEU, according to 
which “[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its 
objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers.” The 
requirement of consistency is further clarified and strengthened by Article 11, which requires 
that “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.”20 
 
 
18 Article 3(1) TEU. These values, according to Article 2 TEU, include the respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men. 
19 Article 3(1)b TFEU. 
20 Similar notions exist regarding e.g. social aspects (Art. 9) and consumer protection (Art. 12). 
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2.2 Development of EU Competition Policy 
 “To define competition policy (or antitrust policy as it is more often called in the US) is not an 
easy task. A possible definition might be as follows: "the set of policies and laws which ensure 
that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a way that is detrimental to society".21 
A small history lesson on EU competition policy is in place for several reasons. First and 
foremost, the development of EU competition policy emphasises the fact that policies change 
over time and are truly contextual. Competition law has focused on multiple different policy 
goals over the years, some of which have been controversial in their ability to protect 
competition. Despite the parade of consumer welfare during the last decade, the history of EU 
competition policy is depicted by occasional inconsistencies.22 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, there seemed to be a consensus on the fact that public policy interests 
were often recognised and considered in interpreting Article 81(1) EC (current Article 101 
TFEU).23 However, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the view of competition specialists 
had already started to shift. The aftermath of EU competition law’s modernisation included a 
growing tendency to separate competition law from the totality of EU law. To simplify, the new 
preference of competition professionals was to separate EU-wide socio-political interests from 
competition law.24 
At the turn of the 21st century, EU competition law went through a comprehensive 
modernisation process. A new institutional structure as well as new procedures were introduced 
by the Commission in 2004.25 The most significant change is most likely Regulation 1/2003, 
according to which the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU was decentralised. 
Decentralisation gave both the Commission and national competition authorities the 
competence to apply the competition rules.26 Gerber views that two separate (yet interlinked) 
modernisation processes took place during this time, as the procedural modernisation was 
accompanied by substantial modernisation. The substantial change is known as “the more 
 
21 Motta 2004, p. 30. 
22 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 19. 
23 Townley 2009, p. 2. See also Monti 2007, p. 90 and Faull - Nikpay 2007, p. 186-188. 
24 Ibid., p. 2. 
25 Gerber 2008, p. 1235. 
26 Doorn 2015, p. 19. 
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economic approach”, whereby economics became central in defining the goals and methods of 
competition law.27 
Both modernisation processes are significant to public policy considerations in the EU. The 
significance of these changes cannot be ignored. In fact, Goyder et al. view EU competition 
policy to have “changed out of all recognition” after the modernisation.28 Before the 
decentralisation of competition enforcement, the Commission had more discretion to apply 
pubic policies and it did on several occasions balance other EU policies against economic 
efficiency. However, decentralisation has become somewhat of an obstacle for public policy 
considerations. Jones et al. imply that it would not be feasible for both the Commission and 
national authorities to have such discretionary powers.29 
Before the modernisation, EU competition law embraced the ideas of ordoliberalism, which 
emphasises the importance of individual economic freedom. Partly due to this approach, 
competition policy was considered by many to be too interventionist. The Commission 
responded to this criticism with the modernisation package. From a theoretical point of view, 
modernisation took EU competition policy from ordoliberalism towards neo-classical 
economics. It is considered to have brought EU competition policy towards U.S. antitrust law.30 
Another way to describe this shift is that a formalistic competition assessment turned into a 
more effects-based approach.31 
Despite the colourful history of EU competition policy, it is by no means implied that this 
development process should be criticised. As Whish and Bailey have aptly stated, “competition 
policy does not exist in a vacuum: it is an expression of the current values and aims of society 
and is as susceptible to change as political thinking generally.”32 This remark is not just an 
accurate description of the nature of EU competition policy – it also emphasizes the importance 
of a contextual approach to the study of EU competition law, which is pursued in this thesis. 
 
 
27 Gerber 2008, p. 1247. 
28 Goyder – Goyder - Albors-Llorens 2009, p. 630. 
29 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 50-51. 
30 Doorn 2015, p. 20-21. See also Gerber 2008, p. 1247. 
31 In general, a formalistic approach may consider certain conduct as illegal per se, whereas an effects-based 
approach concentrates on the effects of the conduct. See Bartalevich 2016, p. 103. 
32 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 19. 
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2.3 The Objectives of EU Competition Law 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As the EU Treaties do not include a detailed explanation of the goals that EU competition rules 
pursue, case law has had a significant role in clarifying these goals.33 The Commission’s so-
called General Guidelines point out two significant goals, stating that the objective of Article 
101 TFEU is to protect competition as a means of “enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring 
an efficient allocation of resources.”34 The rulings of the ECJ suggest that competition law also 
aims to protect the structure of the market and competition as such.”35 Various goals have been 
advocated in legal literature. In addition to consumer welfare and efficiency, the various 
suggested objectives include freedom of choice, economic freedom, fairness, as well as 
protecting the market structure.36 Ultimately, competition is believed to ensure low prices, 
product quality and variety, innovation and output of products, and this premise is the backbone 
of many competition rules.37 Lastly, the single market is an essential goal of the EU, upon which 
competition law has a significant role.38 
From an economically oriented perspective, the goals of EU competition law could be divided 
into the integration goal and the economic goal.39 A more nuanced characterisation is suggested 
by Ezrachi, who depicts the goals of EU competition law to be centred around consumer 
welfare. This primary objective is supported by effective competition structure, efficiency and 
innovation, fairness, consumer well-being, plurality and economic freedom, as well as market 
integration.40  
An attempt to define the objectives of EU competition law is complicated by a dichotomy 
between the Commission and the ECJ. While the Commission has actively contributed to the 
development of EU competition law and policy, its statements regarding the objectives of 
 
33 Barnard - Peers 2014, p. 506. 
34 Commission General Guidelines 2004, para. 13. 
35 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, 
para. 63. See also C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para. 38, and C‑68/12, Slovenská 
sporiteľňa, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71, para. 18. 
36 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 79-80. 
37 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 5. 
38 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 43-44. 
39 The integration goal is rather self-explanatory, and the economic goal refers to effective competition. See Bishop 
- Walker 2010. 
40 Ezrachi 2018, p. 4. 
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competition law have emphasised economic effects, whereas the ECJ has not confirmed this 
approach.41 This dichotomy is visible in the GlaxoSmithKline case, where General Court stated 
that competition rules aim to prevent undertakings from “reducing the welfare of the final 
consumer of the products in question” and mentioned that the Commission’s evaluation was 
based on the same approach.42 The ECJ opposed this view by stating that neither Treaty 
provisions nor case law supports the Commission’s view. Instead, the Court concluded that 
competition rules aim to “protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also 
the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.”43 The various objectives 
suggested to EU competition law are assessed below, with a focus on efficiency and consumer 
welfare. 
2.3.2 Efficiency and Effective Competition 
Efficiency gains can justify an otherwise anti-competitive agreement, if it fulfils the 
requirements set in Article 101(3) TFEU. The efficiency gains mentioned in Article 101(3) are 
intended to cover all objective economic efficiencies, and they may be cost efficiencies or 
qualitative efficiencies, which refer to e.g. product quality and product variety.44 Similarly to 
this provision, the conduct of a dominant undertaking (Article 102 TFEU) may be justified if it 
produces substantial efficiencies that outweigh any negative effects on competition.45 
Efficiency can refer to allocative, productive or dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is 
achieved when a market is in equilibrium, meaning that the production of a good is maintained 
at a level where the market price coincides with the marginal cost. In this situation, no market 
player can benefit without making someone else worse off. This is also known as Pareto 
efficiency.46 Competitive pressure also creates productive efficiency, as companies will try to 
produce goods at the lowest cost possible. This will encourage companies to find new 
techniques to reduce production costs, which will reduce market prices as well.47 Dynamic 
 
41 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 80. 
42 T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265, para. 118. 
43 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, 
para. 62-63. 
44 Commission General Guidelines, para. 59. 
45 Commission Guidance Paper, para. 30. This exception has been established in case law, see e.g. C‑209/10, Post 
Danmark I, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, paragraphs 40 and 41 and C-27/76, United Brands, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para. 
184. 
46 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 8. 
47 Kuoppamäki 2003, p .36. 
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efficiency refers to the assumption that under competitive pressure, companies will try to 
innovate and develop better products. The discussion around innovation and dynamic efficiency 
has especially increased in the context of the digital economy.48 Dynamic efficiency has not 
been scientifically proven and is thus usually studied separately from allocative and productive 
efficiency.49 
“Effective competition” is another term often used in legal provisions and by regulators. A 
noteworthy case regarding efficiency is Continental Can in 1973, when the Court stated that 
the competition provisions (both Article 101 and 102) have as their goal to maintain effective 
competition.50 Furthermore, mergers under the Merger Regulation are assessed based on 
whether they significantly impede effective competition.51 Despite being a significant goal of 
EU competition law, effective competition is difficult to define in legal or economic terms. The 
term can be traced back to the 1940s, when John Maurice Clark developed the concept of 
workable competition. Opposing the idea of perfect competition, Clark proposed that multiple 
different criteria could be used to measure the degree of competition possible to achieve in a 
certain market.52 
2.3.3 Consumer Welfare 
The goal of protecting consumer welfare appears in multiple sources from official documents 
to legal literature and speeches given by EU officials.53 For example, Article 101(3) of TFEU 
states that prohibitions in paragraph 1 are not applicable to agreements etc. which contribute to 
“improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.” Recital 29 of the EU 
Merger Regulation states ”[i]t is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the 
concentration counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to 
consumers, that it might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would 
 
48 Ezrachi 2018, p. 11. 
49 Allocative and productive efficiency are achieved under perfect competition, a theory that is examined in chapter 
4.2.1. See Whish & Bailey 2018, pp. 6-7. 
50 C-6/72, Continental Can, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para. 25. 
51 Merger Regulation, Article 2(3). 
52 Lorenz 2013, p. 21-22. 
53 Consumer welfare has been repeatedly advocated in the speeches of Commissioners. Joaquín Almunia. a former 
Vice-President and Commissioner in charge of competition policy, has stated that “[a]ll of us here today know 
very well what our ultimate objective is: competition policy is a tool at the service of consumers. Consumer welfare 
is at the heart of our policy and its achievement drives our priorities and guides our decisions.” See Almunia 2010. 
 
 12 
  
not significantly impede effective competition …”. As mentioned earlier, the Commission’s 
General Guidelines state that enhancing consumer welfare is one goal pursued by competition 
rules.54 From a theoretical perspective, the EU is a social market economy that aims to distribute 
wealth equally between all market actors, which means that consumers should receive a fair 
share of this wealth.55 
Although the Treaties seem to promote a consumer welfare approach, and the term consumer 
welfare appears in various Commission documents and publications, the EU courts have not 
directly confirmed consumer welfare as a goal of competition law. This is not an insignificant 
remark, since the EU courts have an essential role in interpreting the Treaties.56 However, in 
Post Danmark I, Grand Chamber of the ECJ did consider the effects of a dominant 
undertaking’s conduct on consumers, referring inter alia to consumer welfare, the consumers’ 
interests, and harm to consumers.57 Another interesting remark was made by Advocate General 
Trstenjak in the BIDS case, as she made a distinction between Articles 101(1) and 101(3) stating 
that: 
“different aspects of consumer welfare are taken into account under Article 81(1) 
EC and under Article 81(3) EC. Under Article 81(1) EC, agreements which 
restrict competition between market participants -- directly affect consumer 
welfare and as such are prohibited in principle. Nevertheless, Article 81(3) EC 
recognises that -- the reduction in production costs can contribute indirectly to 
consumer welfare.”58 
Economics has begun to play an integral role in measuring consumer welfare. In its White Paper 
from 1999, the Commission stated that the purpose of Article 101(3) of TFEU is to “provide a 
legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow 
application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations.”59 
According to Monti, this statement implied that the Commission wanted to separate non-
economic values from competition law, which meant a notable shift in competition policy.60 
 
54 Commission General Guidelines 2004, para. 13. 
55 Hildebrand 2016, p. 2-3. 
56 Barnard - Peers 2014, p. 507. 
57 C-209/10, Post Danmark I, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, e.g. paras. 20, 42 and 44. 
58 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in C-209/07, BIDS, ECLI:EU:C:2008:467, paras. 56 and 57. Advocate 
General Wahl has also stated that competition rules aim to promote “the welfare of consumers”. See Opinion of 
Advocate General Wahl in C-230/16, Coty Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2017:603, para. 32 
59 White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, para. 57. 
60 Monti 2007, p. 90. 
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The Commission’s General Guidelines, issued five years later, promote a similar economically 
oriented approach.61 
Current legal literature suggests that the more economic approach, leading into a narrow, price-
centred idea of consumer welfare, might need rethinking. Especially from the perspective of 
the digital economy, it has been argued that a rigid price-centric approach cannot respond to 
the developments of a modern society.62 Ezrachi clarifies this by introducing three overlapping 
yet separate terms: consumer well-being (an abstract goal mentioned in TFEU), consumer 
welfare (the main goal of competition law), and the economic conception of consumer surplus, 
which is used to measure consumer welfare. Consumer surplus is the narrowest of these terms, 
indicating that the economic tools used to measure consumer welfare are not able to measure 
“the full spectrum of welfare effects”.63 
An interest towards a revised competition policy can be seen in the political field as well. The 
European Parliament advocates for a ‘fundamental overhaul of competition policy’ in its annual 
own-initiative report from January 2019. In its report, the Parliament: 
“Underlines the fact that competition rules are treaty based and, -- should be seen 
in the light of the wider European values underpinning Union legislation 
regarding social affairs, the social market economy, environmental standards, 
climate policy and consumer protection; takes the view that the application of EU 
competition law should address all market distortions, including those created by 
negative social and environmental externalities”.64 
The Parliament thus recognises the challenging relationship between competition law and these 
multidisciplinary interests. The report implicates that there is a political interest to include 
broader interests in competition policy. 
 
61 The objective of Article 101 (formerly Article 81), according to the guidelines, is to “protect competition on the 
market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.” See 
Commission General Guidelines 2004, para. 13. 
62 See Wasastjerna 2019, p. 152. 
63 Ezrachi 2018, p. 6. Gerbrandy makes a similar argument, suggesting that the current efficiency-focused approach 
might ignore significant societal issues. See Gerbrandy 2019, p. 131. 
64 Parliament Annual Report (2018/2102(INI)), paragraphs 8 and 10. 
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2.3.4 Protecting the Competitive Process or Protecting Competition 
Protecting the competitive process can be viewed as a good itself. An environment that is ideal 
for creating and upholding competition is therefore maintained by protecting the competitive 
process itself, since the outcome of this process is not regarded as important. A distinction must 
be made between this and the previous approach. The approach introduced here believes that 
protecting the competitive process itself is the goal, whereas ordoliberalists view that the 
competitive process should be protected as a means to enhance individual economic freedom 
and participation in the market.65 Protecting competition as such has been recognised in the 
decisions of ECJ as well.66 
2.3.5 Economic Freedom and the Dispersal of Economic Power 
Protecting the individual economic freedom has its roots in ordoliberalism. Ideally, economic 
freedom guarantees that economic actors can operate in the market without being restricted by 
private or public economic power. At its extreme, this goal is criticised to ultimately disperse 
large but efficient companies, even if their actions do not restrict competition.67 This goal is 
similar to the protection of competitors, which is often linked to distrust regarding big firms. A 
relevant distinction should be made between whether competitors are protected in order to 
protect competition itself, or certain competitors are protected in order to maintain the current 
market structure or to protect those certain smaller competitors.68 From an economic 
perspective, the latter is actually said to be put consumer welfare to a disadvantage. Especially 
Chicago scholars have avoided this “sentimental” approach due to its economic indications.69 
2.3.6 Fairness and Equality 
Despite its ambiguous nature, fairness and the notion of fair competition is rather common in 
discussion regarding EU competition law.70 In this sense, fairness in competition law can be 
divided to horizontal fairness on the demand side (between consumers) and on the supply side 
 
65 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 31. 
66 See e.g. C‑68/12, Slovenská sporiteľňa, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71, para. 18 and Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 
P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. 
67 Cseres 2005, p. 248. 
68 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 31. 
69 EU competition law, on the contrary, is known to have had such a “sentimental” approach in several cases. See 
Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 21. 
70 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 86-87. 
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(between producers), as well as vertical fairness (between producers and consumers) and 
procedural fairness. Alternatively, fairness can be understood as a natural outcome of 
competition law instead of its goal. The word ‘competition’ itself refers to equal opportunity, 
and thus implies that fairness is already an essential part of competition law.71 Fairness can also 
be viewed as an element of consumer welfare. In Commissioner Vestager’s speech in 2018, she 
stated that “[l]ike any other rules that govern our world, we have competition rules because we 
believe they make our society a better place to live. That they make our markets work more 
fairly for consumers.”72 According to another speech, “our only goal, as competition 
authorities, is to make sure that consumers get a fair deal.”73 
Equality in all the Union’s activities is pursued by Article 8 TFEU. As wealth inequality has 
become an increasingly topical concern, some view competition laws as a potential weapon to 
fight against it. This approach would argue that market power creates inequality, and that 
competition enforcement could create equality by redistribution. This way, competition law 
would promote economic equity over economic efficiency.74 From the perspective of the 
European school of thought, social fairness and social equality are core values of the social 
market economy, and thus the equality principle can be viewed as an integral objective, or an 
intrinsic value, of EU competition law. The equality principle can be perceived through fair 
wealth distribution or as equal competition conditions between market actors.75 
2.3.7 Single Market 
Competition law is an essential instrument of single market integration, an objective unique to 
the European Union.76 Competition policy was in fact among the set of policy instruments that 
were intended to enhance the objective of economic integration in the Treaty of Rome.77 Article 
3(3) of TEU sets out the goal of establishing an internal market, which is defined in Article 26 
 
71 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 31-33. 
72 Vestager 2018b. 
73 Vestager 2018a. 
74 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 20. 
75 Equality through fair wealth distribution is pursued by Article 101(3) TFEU. Equality in competitive conditions 
can be perceived in abuse cases, for example. A dominant company is not assumed to engage in abusive behaviour, 
unless such conduct is proven. On the other hand, abusive behaviour is condemned, since the non-dominant 
company has no chance to compete by such behaviour. See Hildebrand 2016, pp. 3-4. 
76 See e.g. Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, Football Association Premier League, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631. 
For legal literature, see Bishop - Walker 2010, p. 5 and Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 23. 
77 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 43-44. Jones et al. mention several cases, where the Commission and ECJ have 
stressed the nature of competition rules in achieving the single market. In 2015, Commissioner Vestager stated 
that “Competition policy is very much at the core of the process of European integration.” See Vestager 2015a. 
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of TFEU as follows: “[t]he internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaties.” 
The single market has been set up by removing regulatory barriers to trade, and competition 
law can be used to ensure that there are no private restrictions which might form similar barriers. 
The European single market has recently opened up to new dimensions, as the Digital Single 
Market Strategy was adopted in 2015.78 The Digital Single Market ensures the free movement 
of persons, services and capital, and that individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and 
engage in online activities under conditions of fair competition.79 The Commission recently 
initiated public consultations regarding two new legislative instruments as a part of the Digital 
Services Act package, which shows that the regulatory environment is slowly starting to react 
to the fast developments of the digital economy.80 
 
  
 
78 Hildebrand 2016, pp. 59-60. 
79 European Commission, Shaping the Digital Single Market. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market.  
80 European Commission, The Digital Services Act package. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-
services-act-package.  
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3 Public Policy Considerations and EU Competition Law 
3.1 Defining Public Policy Considerations 
In civil law systems, public policy or ordre public is considered to form the foundations of a 
legal and social system. The common law understanding of public policy is wider, as it may 
also entail political preferences regarding societal priorities. Public policy is terminologically 
often linked with public interest, although some commentators consider these concepts to be 
distinct from each other.81 Public interest is a somewhat more abstract concept, which describes 
the opposite of private interest. Public interest can refer to the society, a group of individuals, 
or local interests.82 
Knoepfel and Larrue define public policy as follows: 
“a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities taken or carried out by 
different public – and sometimes – private actors -- with a view to resolving in a 
targeted manner a problem that is politically defined as collective in nature. This 
group of decisions and activities gives rise to formalised actions -- that are often 
aimed at modifying the behaviour of social groups presumed to be at the root of, 
or able to solve, the collective problem to be resolved -- ".83 
In the context of the Treaties, public policy may constitute an exception to the free movement 
rights.84 Looking at the TFEU’s provisions having general application (Title II), all Union 
policies and activities should consider equality (Article 8), employment, social protection, 
education and human health (Article 9), environmental protection and sustainable development 
(Article 11), and consumer protection (Article 12). In specified Union policies, animal welfare 
should be considered as well (Article 13). 
For the purposes of this thesis, public policy considerations should be understood in a rather 
broad manner, as possibly overlapping with the concept of public interest. Public policy 
considerations may in some instances restrict the application of competition rules, and in some 
 
81 Bělohlávek – Rozehnalová 2012, p. 118. 
82 Ibid., p. 121. 
83 Knoepfel – Larrue 2007, p. 24. 
84 For example, Article 36 TFEU may allow restrictions on imports or exports, if they are justified on grounds of 
public policy. 
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instances guide legislative or other government activities.85 In the context of competition law, 
public policy considerations represent non-economic or non-competition interests, which often 
pursue values promoted in other areas of EU law. Since private actors may also engage in 
initiatives that promote the public interest (e.g. sustainability agreements), public policy 
considerations should also include certain activities of private actors. All in all, this definition 
conceives public policy considerations as values often colliding with economic interests and 
the efficiency goal of competition law, at least prima facie. 
There are currently a few exemptions within the EU competition regime that allow for public 
policy considerations. Article 346(1) b of TFEU provides that competition rules are not 
applicable and thus competition is not considered to be hampered if a Member State engaging 
in arms trade takes protective measures to guard its national security. Article 106(2) of TFEU 
contains an exemption for undertakings of general economic interest whose performance is 
hindered by competition rules. Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation allows Member States 
to protect “legitimate interests” arising in mergers to which the Regulation is applicable. These 
interests may include public security, plurality of the media or other public interests. 
Legal literature mentions public policies and the public interest as a possible goal of competition 
law. According to Jones et al., certain governmental policies may be advanced by means of 
competition law. These policies might aim to protect for example employment, different 
industries, the environment, social aspects or regional interests.86 Whish and Bailey mention 
unemployment and regional policies as interests that often arise in merger cases.87 Another 
noteworthy issue is protecting national firms from foreign takeovers, and other such national 
interests or Union-wide interests.88 National interests and the European interest against third 
countries has been visible in recent discussion regarding the so-called European champions.89 
 
85 In this sense, public policy considerations (in the context of this thesis) have both a negative and a positive 
dimension. 
86 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 34. 
87 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 23. 
88 Ibid., p. 23. Foreign subsidies are an example of a recent example of protecting the single market. The 
Commission has stated that foreign subsidisation, while giving opportunities to the Union, poses a risk of 
undermining competitiveness and the level playing field in the EU. See Commission White Paper on levelling the 
playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253, p. 6. 
89 The proposed merger between Siemens and Alstom sparked the discussion of European champions. Although 
the merger was prohibited, some would have preferred to allow the creation of a European champion to compete 
with China. See M.8677, Siemens/Alstom, para. 495 and Bublitz - Leisinger - Yang 2019, p. 309. 
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In addition to the aforementioned, Monti’s assessment of public policies includes consumer 
policy and culture.90 
Using competition law as a means to promote certain socio-political goals is criticized for the 
fact that public policies might hamper the efficiency goal. Some jurisdictions, such as South 
Africa and China nevertheless have governmental policies incorporated into their competition 
laws. The weakness of public policy considerations lies perhaps in the vagueness of the term. 
Public interest goals of competition law raise concerns due to the fact that they might leave too 
much to the discretion of the courts and include value-based decisions, which are more difficult 
to measure with economic terms.91 
3.2 Past Cases 
3.2.1 Environmental Concerns 
The crossover between competition and environmental protection can be traced back to the 
1990s. In Exxon/Shell, the Commission assessed an anticompetitive agreement, which would 
reduce costs, improve product quality, reduce the use of raw materials and plastic waste, and 
thus the environmental risks related to the transport of polyethylene. These positive effects, 
according to the Commission, would be perceived as “beneficial by many consumers at a time 
when the limitation of natural resources and threats to the environment are of increasing public 
concern.”92 In Philips/Osram, the Commission concluded that the use of cleaner facilities 
would reduce air pollution, which in turn would benefit consumers directly and indirectly from 
reduced negative externalities.93 
The CECED case94 is an especially noteworthy example of how environmental aspects have 
been considered on grounds of Article 101(3). The members of CECED, having over 90% of 
the EU market together, had entered into an agreement that aimed inter alia to reduce the energy 
 
90 Monti 2007, p. 99-102. In response to a written question by the European Parliament, the Commission has stated 
that it is “prepared to take account of cultural aspects in its decision making under EC Treaty provisions, such as 
in application of the Community competition rules.” The Commission even considered this obligatory under the 
current Article 167(4) TFEU. See Van Miert’s answer to written question regarding book price agreements, E-
0773/98, 1998. 
91 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 34-35. 
92 IV/33.640, Exxon/Shell, para. 71. 
93 IV/34.252, Philips/Osram, para. 27. 
94 IV.F.1/36.718, CECED, 2000/475/EC. 
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consumption of domestic washing machines. Even though the agreement was considered to 
restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1), the Commission concluded that the 
agreement was exempt under Article 101(3) due to its environmental benefits.95 In its 
assessment, the Commission considered both individual economic benefits and collective 
environmental benefits. The latter was especially interesting, since the Commission concluded 
in its assessment that “environmental results for society would adequately allow consumers a 
fair share of the benefits even if no benefits accrued to individual purchasers of machines.”96 
Another environmental case worth mentioning is DSD, where the Commission considered the 
fact that certain agreements regarding a waste collection system gave effect to national and EU 
legislation regarding packaging waste and concluded that consumers would benefit from the 
improvement of environmental quality, namely the reduction of packaging waste.97 
The Commission has later perhaps downplayed the relevance of the CECED decision. In the 
Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines, a very similar case is presented as an example of 
standardisation agreements, but the grounds for applying Article 101(3) are mostly based on 
direct qualitative and cost efficiencies (such as an increased amount of washing programmes 
and lower energy costs). The environmental benefits for society are thus ignored, or at least 
formulated in more economic terms.98 From a contextual point of view, it should be noted that 
the CECED decision was made before the modernisation and the decentralisation of 
enforcement. After this development in EU competition law, the prevailing view has been that 
decisions such as CECED, whereby agreements that restrict competition are justified for 
promoting other EU policy goals, would no longer be possible.99 
3.2.2 Industrial and Social Policy 
The Commission has balanced industrial policy goals against undistorted competition 
especially in the 1980s, when it exempted so-called crisis cartels. These restructuring 
agreements were found to restrict competition, as they aimed to create a situation where the 
remaining competitors could raise prices to a profitable level.100 In an industry suffering from 
 
95 Talus 2011, p. 257. 
96 IV.F.1/36.718, CECED, 2000/475/EC, para. 56. The Commission took into account Article 174 of the EC 
Treaty, which promotes i.a. rational utilisation of natural resources. 
97 COMP D3/34493, DSD, paras. 143 and 148. 
98 Commission Horizontal Guidelines, para. 329. 
99 Buttigieg 2009, p. 134-135. 
100 Witt 2012, pp. 447-448. 
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economic recession, however, the Commission considered that such agreements would re-
establish secure market conditions. The expected increases in prices were allowed, since the 
agreements were believed to guarantee a more stable supply of goods.101 The effects of the 
recession were explicitly addressed by the Commission in its Tenth Report on Competition 
Policy, where it stated that in the current circumstances, “competition policy not only has to 
sustain effective competition; it has to support an industrial policy which promotes the 
necessary restructuring.”102 A recent example of the industrial policy debate is the prohibited  
Alstom/Siemens merger, which raised discussion of the European champions.103 
Historically, social considerations have been relevant within industrial policy, as employment 
aspects have also been considered in the assessment of restructuring agreements.104 Looking 
back to even earlier cases, the ECJ’s decision in Metro was significant as regards employment. 
In this case, the ECJ assessed a selective distribution system for electric equipment. Despite the 
fact that public policy considerations did not justify the restriction of competition, the court 
considered that employment could be considered as an exception under Article 101(3).105 
3.2.3 Professional Rules and Regulatory Ancillary – the Wouters Doctrine 
In Wouters, the ECJ assessed the Netherlands Bar rules, which prohibited professional 
partnerships between lawyers and consultants. The reasoning behind the prohibition was to 
protect the independent exercise of the profession.106 The ECJ considered that the legislation 
had an adverse effect on competition in the meaning of Article 101(1) of TFEU, but that the 
objectives of these restrictions could be taken into account in the assessment. The ECJ 
concluded that the national legislation did not infringe Article 101(1), since it was “necessary 
for the proper practice of the legal profession, as organised in the Member State concerned.”107 
This case created the so-called Wouters doctrine, according to which a restrictive decision of 
 
101 See e.g. IV/31.846, Enichem/ICI, paras. 32 and 38, IV/31.055, ENI/Montedison, paras. 31-32, and IV/30.863, 
BPCL/ICI, para. 36. 
102 Commission’s Tenth Report on Competition Policy 1981, p. 9. 
103 See M.8677, Siemens/Alstom, para. 495 and Bublitz - Leisinger - Yang 2019, p. 309. 
104 In Ford/Volkswagen, the Commission took into account that the joint venture would create 5,000 more jobs. 
See IV/33.814, Ford/Volkswagen, para. 36 and Witt 2012, p. 450. 
105 C-26-76, Metro, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167, paras. 1 and 43. 
106 C-309/99, Wouters, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, para. 16. 
107 C-309/99, Wouters, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, para. 110. 
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an association of undertakings could be exempted from the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, 
if such a restriction was inherent in pursuing a legitimate objective.108 
The Wouters case raised the question of what kind of objectives can justify a restriction within 
Article 101(1). Legal literature divides into two types of interpretation. Some view that certain 
self-regulatory measures, that would otherwise infringe Article 101(1), could be allowed if they 
served the public interest.109 Monti argues that by the Wouters judgement, the ECJ attempted 
to establish a doctrine of including public policy considerations in the assessment of 
competition cases.110 The other line of interpretation is based on the argument of regulatory 
ancillarity. According to Whish and Bailey, the restrictions in Wouters were ancillary to a 
regulatory function, which aimed to guarantee integrity and experience in the legal 
profession.111 The second interpretation thus links the public interest aspect to some type of 
government involvement.112 
A continuum of the Wouters case is OTOC, where a professional association, OTOC, adopted 
a regulation that required compulsory training for chartered accountants. Citing the Wouters 
case, the ECJ did consider the objective of the restrictive measure, which was to guarantee the 
quality of services in accounting. However, the ECJ concluded that the restrictions go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve this objective and thus violate Article 101(1) TFEU.113 Similarly, 
in the API case, the ECJ considered that while road safety could constitute a legitimate objective 
within the meaning of the Wouters doctrine, the fixing of minimum operating costs cannot be 
justified by a such an objective.114 
What is the relevance of the Wouters case law? It has been argued cases regarding professional 
rules – Wouters, OTOC and CNG – could be explained in economic terms and in close 
accordance with Article 101(3) TFEU. The professional services in these cases are difficult for 
the consumer to evaluate, which ultimately might lead to an information asymmetry between 
the consumers and the service providers. The professional rules placed on said professionals 
 
108 Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 335. 
109 Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 335. See also Komninos 2005, p. 13 and Nazzini 2006, p. 526. 
110 This type of balancing could be compared to free movement cases, where mandatory requirements of public 
policy may be included in the assessment. See Monti 2002, p. 1088. 
111 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 139. 
112 Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 335.  
113 C‑1/12, OTOC, ECLI:EU:C:2013:127, paras. 93, 100, 108. A third relevant case regarding professional rules 
is CNG, in which the ECJ considered professional rules for geologists. See C‑136/12, CNG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:489, 
para. 57. 
114 Joined Cases C‑184/13 to C‑187/13, C‑194/13, C‑195/13 and C‑208/13, API, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, paras. 
48, 51, 57. 
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could be viewed as a response to a market failure, namely information asymmetry. From an 
economic perspective, a response to a market failure can lead to efficiencies which benefit the 
consumer. To conclude, the Wouters case law regarding professional rules could be explained 
in economic terms.115 
However, within the Wouters case law, the ECJ has also assessed certain public policy 
objectives which cannot be formulated in economic terms. These considerations include the 
sound administration of justice (Wouters) and the protection of road safety (API). One 
distinctive factor is that in the Wouters case law, the association of undertakings which adopted 
the restrictive measure, was founded in public law. Thus, in all these cases, the government is 
somehow involved in assigning the tasks of the association.116 This explanation reflects the 
term regulatory ancillarity suggested by Whish and Bailey.117 The relevance of the Wouters 
doctrine is perhaps centred around the cases described above.118 
The brief assessment of the Wouters doctrine provides an insightful example of the balancing 
of different interests in competition cases. It must be noted that in neither Wouters nor in API 
did the ECJ clearly state that the public policy consideration in question would constitute a 
legitimate interest to be balanced against Article 101(1) TFEU.119 Despite this, it could be 
argued that these cases have involved some type of public policy assessment. As the cases 
linked with regulatory ancillarity are about public policy interests ultimately guarded by the 
government (a public entity), a difficult question arises when one considers the possibility of 
private entities to protect public policy interests. 
3.2.4 Privacy in the Digital Economy 
The rapidly developing digital economy has given rise to a debate regarding the value of 
personal data in a competition assessment. A momentous case regarding privacy concerns is 
the German Facebook case. The Bundeskartellamt prohibited Facebook from using exploitative 
business terms, whereby Facebook combined data received from Facebook user accounts with 
 
115 See Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 337 and Colomo 2012, pp. 550-551. For further remarks on asymmetries 
in the liberal professions and their regulation, see Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services, 
2004. 
116 Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, pp. 337-338. 
117 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 139. 
118 Janssen - Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 339. 
119 In API, the ECJ did state that “it cannot be ruled out” that road safety is a legitimate interest. See Janssen - 
Kloosterhuis 2016, p. 338 and API, para. 51. 
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data received from Facebook’s other social media platforms (such as WhatsApp and 
Instagram), or from third party websites which include a “Like” or “Share” button. According 
to the Bundeskartellamt’s decision, Facebook’s data gathering practices constituted an abuse of 
dominant position, while also violating the European data protection rules.120 The main 
proceedings are still open, as Facebook appealed the decision to the Düsseldorf Higher Regional 
Court.121 
The Facebook case raises the question of whether data and privacy should be considered in 
competition assessment, as personal data is a valuable asset, yet it does not necessarily show in 
a firm’s market share. It has been suggested that personal data could be assessed as a quality 
element of a product, or in a wider sense, as part of consumer well-being.122 The digital 
economy discussion perhaps falls outside the scope of public policy considerations, at least to 
the extent that personal data is considered as a quality element of a product. However, it clearly 
demonstrates that competition law may need to accommodate multidisciplinary and non-
economic values due to the developments in our (digital) society.123 Furthermore, privacy and 
the protection of personal data is protected by fundamental and human rights, which gives this 
discussion significant weight.124 Privacy and data protection are also ultimately linked to human 
dignity, an absolute human right.125 
3.2.5 Rights of the Defence 
On one hand, fundamental and human rights can be conceived as an interest colliding with 
economic interests in the competition assessment. On the other hand, fundamental and human 
rights might arise in the procedural aspects of competition cases, namely as the rights of the 
defence. One recent example of the human rights aspect in competition proceedings is the 
decision of the Finnish Deputy Chancellor of Justice (DCJ), according to which the Finnish 
 
120 Bunderskartellamt B6-22/16, Facebook, 2019. See also Bundeskartellamt’s press release of 7 February 2019. 
121 The Bundeskartellamt’s decision was first suspended by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court in interim 
proceedings (VI – Kart 1/19), but this decision was opposed by the Federal Court of Justice in a decision of 23 
June 2020 (KVR 69/19), according to which Facebook must implement the Bundeskartellamt’s decision. See 
Lexology 2020. 
122 Wasastjerna 2019, pp. 184-185. 
123 The Commission has already reacted to the developments in the digital economy by launching an initiative to 
create a new tool to address competition in platform-based and other markets. See Commission Impact 
Assessment, New Competition Tool, Ref Ares(2020)2877634, p. 1. 
124 The right to respect for private and family life is ensured in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, whereas the right to the protection of personal data is enshrined in Article 8. 
125 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 47. 
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Competition Authority’s conduct to prohibit recordings of hearings is unlawful. The 
competition authority’s conduct was considered to violate the freedom of speech and rights of 
defence, both protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Furthermore, 
the DCJ emphasised the right to a fair trial, the principle of equality of arms and principles of 
good governance.126 
In addition to having a human rights element, the rights of defence constitute a general principle 
of EU law.127 A “textbook example” of the rights of defence, as described by Advocate General 
Kokott, can be found in UPS.128 In UPS, the Commission appealed against the General Court’s 
decision, whereby the Commission’s decision to prohibit the merger between UPS and TNT 
was annulled. The ECJ dismissed the Commission’s appeal on the grounds that the rights of 
defence had been violated, as the Commission had adopted its decision relying on an 
econometric model which had not been brought to the attention of the parties concerned. The 
ECJ also emphasised that the rights of the defence are closely linked to the principle of good 
administration, guaranteed in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.129 In certain cases where the Commission has issued fines but the parties involved 
consider that their rights of defence have been violated, the fines have been reduced by the EU 
courts.130 
Addressing the rights of defence in competition law entails a balancing between effective 
enforcement of competition law and procedural fairness. The latter is closely linked to 
fundamental and human rights, as well as to the rule of law.131 It has been argued that the 
Commission has a rather low burden of proof in competition enforcement, which depicts a 
similar balancing between effectiveness and the rights of the defence.132 
 
126 Deputy Chancellor of Justice: decision regarding lawyer’s right to record the hearing and inspection situation. 
OKV/3/10/2020, p. 2 and 5. The DCJ referred to Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) of the ECHR. 
127 See e.g. C‑349/07, Sopropé, ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, para. 36 and C‑265/17 P, UPS, ECLI:EU:C:2019:23, para. 
28. 
128 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in C‑265/17 P, UPS, ECLI:EU:C:2018:628, para. 21. 
129 C‑265/17 P, UPS, ECLI:EU:C:2019:23, paras. 4, 5 and 34. See also Opinion of Advocate General Warner in 
C-17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association, ECLI:EU:C:1974:91, p. 1089. 
130 See e.g. C-607/18 P, NKT, ECLI:EU:C:2020:385. 
131 Sokol - Lianos 2012, pp. 22-24. 
132 Raitio 2018, p. 492. 
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3.3 Sustainability as a Recent Example 
3.3.1 Sustainability in the European Union 
Sustainability has become an extremely topical question in the European competition arena. As 
a non-economic, multidisciplinary value, which does not directly benefit the consumer, it could 
be depicted as a public policy consideration as well. Thus, this chapter will highlight 
sustainability as a topical dimension of public policy considerations and review the difficult 
questions related to it. 
One definition of sustainability can be found in the so-called Brundtland Report, according to 
which “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”133 A topical document 
in this regard is the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which all United Nations 
Member States adopted in 2015. The goals in this agenda include three dimensions of 
sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental.134 As sustainable 
development is sometimes linked narrowly to environmental issues only, it is necessary to 
highlight that it also includes an economic and social aspect. The EU has also aligned its 
policies with the 2030 Agenda.135 
Although sustainability is a somewhat recent trend in political and academic discourse, it is by 
no means a new concept. It is embedded in the Union’s objectives, as Article 3 TEU aims for 
“the sustainable development of Europe”, and even “the sustainable development of the Earth”. 
As the protection of the environment is a central element of sustainability, it should be 
emphasised that the EU also aims to improve the quality of the environment.136 The difficult 
question is how these objectives could or should be considered in competition law. 
 
133 Brundtland Report 1987, p. 43. See also UN Resolution 66/288, which describes sustainable development as 
the development towards “an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for 
present and future generations.” 
134 The 2030 Agenda includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets. To give a few examples, the 
manifold goals include ending poverty and hunger, achieving gender equality, promoting sustainable economic 
growth and decent work, ensuring access for affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy, combating 
climate change, and ensuring sustainable consumption. See UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 2015, 
p. 1 and 14. 
135 The New European Consensus on Development 2017, para. 7. 
136 See Articles 3(3) and 3(5) TEU. 
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3.3.2 Recent Developments 
As mentioned in chapter 2.3.3, the European Parliament has already called for consistency 
between competition rules and the different values of the Treaties.137 A significant sustainability 
initiative in EU policy is the European Green Deal, which aims for the EU to be climate neutral 
by 2050.138 Commissioner Vestager has emphasised the widespread impact of this objective, 
stating that “all of Europe’s policies – including competition policy – will have their role to play 
in helping to get us there.”139 One concrete consequence of the Green Deal can be found in the 
Farm to Fork Strategy, an initiative which aims to ensure sustainable food systems. The 
Commission recognises in the strategy that competition rules need to be clarified in order to 
allow for collective initiatives which promote sustainability in supply chains.140 Commissioner 
Vestager has also suggested that the Commission’s ongoing review of the two Horizontal Block 
Exemption Regulations141 could be an opportunity to provide guidelines on sustainability 
agreements that do not infringe competition rules.142 
A significant development within the Member States has been the draft guidelines on 
sustainability agreements, issued by the Dutch competition authority (ACM). The sustainability 
guidelines follow the three-fold UN definition, according to which sustainable development is 
development towards “an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our 
planet and for present and future generations.143 Under this definition, the guidelines aim to 
clarify the situations in which certain sustainability agreements do not infringe Article 101 
TFEU and the Dutch Competition Act.144 
Within the “old” competition regime, environmental concerns were considered in multiple 
cases. Exxon/Shell, Philips/Osram, CECED and DSD (all reviewed above in chapter 3.2.1) are 
examples of the pre-modernisation case law, where sustainability concerns have been 
 
137 Within the context of sustainability, it is especially significant that the Parliament “underlines -- that the narrow 
interpretation of Article 101 of the TFEU by the Commission’s horizontal guidelines has increasingly been 
considered an obstacle to the collaboration of smaller market players for the adoption of higher environmental and 
social standards”, and “stresses that consumers have interests other than low prices alone, including animal 
welfare, environmental sustainability, rural development and initiatives to reduce antibiotic use and stave off 
antimicrobial resistance, etc.” See Parliament Annual Report (2018/2102(INI)), paras. 48 and 78. 
138 Commission Communication on the European Green Deal 2019, p. 2. 
139 Vestager 2019. 
140 Commission Communication on the Farm to Fork Strategy 2020, p. 10. 
141 Commission Regulations (EU) No 1217/2010 (Research & Development Block Exemption Regulation - 'R&D 
BER') and 1218/2010 (Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation - 'Specialisation BER'). 
142 See Vestager 2019. 
143 ACM draft guidelines on sustainability agreements, para. 6. See also UN Resolution 66/288 2012, para. 1. 
144 Ibid., para. 8. 
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accommodated.145 Sustainability is therefore not a new phenomenon at all, although it has 
received significant public attention only in the recent years. Post-modernisation cases have not 
been that successful from the perspective of sustainability. However, the growing attention on 
sustainability in competition cases demonstrates that it is increasingly difficult for EU 
competition law to isolate itself. 
The problems in reconciling sustainability measures with competition rules are explicitly 
presented in the Dutch Energieakkoord case. In 2013, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers 
and Markets (ACM) assessed a plan to close down five power plants from the 1980s. The plan 
was based on the SER Energieakkoord for Sustainable Growth, an accord aiming to make 
energy supply in the Netherlands more sustainable. The plan was expected to fall under the 
exemption in Article 101 (3) TFEU, as well as the corresponding national exemption, as closing 
down the plants would have resulted in more sustainable energy production. However, the 
ACM estimated that this would also lead to increased prices. According to its analysis, the 
environmental benefits were insufficient compared to the price increase that would harm Dutch 
electricity buyers. The ACM thus concluded that closing down the power plants did not fulfil 
the requirements of the exemption laid out in EU and national legislation.146 
Another interesting Dutch case is the Chicken of Tomorrow, which involved a sustainability 
agreement between producers and retailers promoting animal welfare, the environment and 
public health. An especially interesting feature of the case is that the ACM conducted a conjoint 
analysis in order to assess whether consumers would be willing to pay for the increased animal 
welfare and other measures pursued by the agreement. Based on the study, the ACM concluded 
that consumers would be willing to pay a small amount for the animal welfare and 
environmental measures, but the amount did not cover the price increase caused by the 
sustainability agreement. The sustainability agreement was thus not justified by Article 101(3) 
and constituted an infringement of competition rules.147 Two points can be made about the 
Chicken of Tomorrow. First, despite the outcome of the case, it is significant for the 
sustainability discussion that a competition authority has concluded by conjoint analysis that 
consumers, at least in a specific market, are actually willing to pay (a small amount) for 
sustainability measures. Secondly, behavioural economics suggest that consumers’ purchasing 
 
145 See IV/33.640, Exxon/Shell; IV/34.252, Philips/Osram; IV.F.1/36.718, CECED, 2000/475/EC and COMP 
D3/34493 – DSD. 
146 ACM analysis in Energieakkoord, 2013, pp. 6-7. 
147 ACM analysis in Chicken of Tomorrow. ACM/DM/2014/206028, p. 6. 
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choices are not necessarily a plain and clear demonstration of how much they are willing to pay 
for more sustainable products.148 
Two significant mergers in the agricultural markets, Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto, are 
also worth mentioning within the sustainability theme. Both mergers were cleared by the 
Commission subject to structural remedies. When evaluating the effects of the Dow/DuPont 
merger, the Commission emphasised the significance of safe (innovative) crop protection 
products, which would ensure environmental safety and human and animal health.149 The 
Bayer/Monsanto merger showed that other interests, in this case food safety, environment and 
climate, are difficult to fit in the competitive assessment of a merger review.150 During its 
investigation, the Commission received over 50 000 petitions by email, over 5 000 petitions by 
letters and postcards, and uncounted tweets expressing concerns regarding the merger.151 In its 
press release, the Commission underlined that it can only assess the merger from a competition 
perspective. According to the press release, “[w]hile these concerns are of great importance, 
they cannot form the basis of a merger assessment.”152 
3.3.3 How Could Competition Law Promote Sustainability? 
Although this thesis does not pursue practical solutions, a few words can be said about 
accommodating sustainability concerns in competition law. This practical example emphasises 
that public policy concerns may be accommodated within the Treaty framework. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that certain interests that are often categorised as “non-economic” or considered 
solely value-based, may possibly be translated into economic or more competition-oriented 
terms. 
Primarily, it seems that sustainability concerns could be accommodated in competition law 
without amending the Treaties themselves, as sustainability is already addressed in their 
provisions.153 Sustainable development is one of the objectives of the EU expressed in Articles 
3(3) and 3(5) TEU. Sustainability should also be acknowledged in the EU’s policies and 
activities under Article 11 TFEU. The Treaty articles thus provide a solid foundation for 
 
148 Behavioural biases are discussed in more detail in chapter 4.1.3. For an insightful review on behavioural biases 
in relation to products with an environmental impact, see Volpin 2020, p. 11. 
149 M.7932 – Dow/DuPont, para. 1980. 
150 M.8084 – Bayer/Monsanto, paras. 3015 and 3016. 
151 Vestager 2017. 
152 Commission Press Release IP/18/2282. 
153 See e.g. Holmes 2020b, pp. 358-359 and De Stefano 2020, p. 44. 
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sustainability initiatives. However, the relationship between sustainability and competition 
could be clarified with Commission guidelines that give further instructions on how the balance 
is struck between these two in competition enforcement. In addition, block exemption 
regulation could be implemented to cover otherwise anti-competitive behaviour that 
sufficiently promotes sustainability.154 
The inclusion of sustainability concerns could be argued to be possible within the economic 
framework that is currently applied. The argument is based on the premise that the benefits or 
damage that certain measures create could be quantifiable to some extent, and thus explained 
in economic terms.155 For example, the Dutch sustainability guidelines recognise that 
environmental factors can sometimes be quantified by measuring the reduction or increase in 
harmful emissions over a specific period of time.156 It has also been argued that sustainability 
could be interpreted as a non-price factor of a product, such as a quality-enhancing factor.157 
Kingston suggests that a holistic approach, one that balances sustainability against economic 
objectives, would require that the principle of proportionality is used to balance between these 
colliding interests.158 
Another interesting element of modern sustainability initiatives is that they are often pursued 
by private actors, as is the case in sustainability agreements between undertakings. Sustainable 
development and other public policy goals have traditionally been considered as objectives 
pursued by governments, international organisations or other entities of a public nature.159 The 
notion of private actors pursuing public policy objectives creates complexities on how public 
policy considerations are perceived and regulated. With the rise of corporate social 
responsibility, this new phenomenon provides a new perspective on public policy initiatives 
and requires flexibility from the legislator in order to succeed.160 
 
154 Holmes argues that amending the Treaties does not seem necessary but could be used as a last resort. See 
Holmes 2020b, p. 359. 
155 Kingston 2012, p. 163. 
156 ACM draft guidelines on sustainability agreements, para. 32. 
157 Volpin 2020, p. 10. Volpin argues that by measuring sustainability in more economic terms, it does not have to 
be always conceived as a public policy exception. Some authors recognize, however, that not all aspects of 
sustainability can be measured in such economic or competition-terms. See Gerbrandy 2020, p. 66. 
158 Kingston 2012, p. 124. 
159 Gerbrandy 2019, p. 136. 
160 For discussion on corporate social responsibility and regulation, see Berger-Walliser - Scott 2018. 
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3.4 Public Policy Considerations and the Freedom of Movement Rights 
An interesting perspective to this topic is how public policy issues have been considered in 
cases regarding the internal market and the freedom of movement rights protecting it.161 Cassis 
de Dijon introduced mandatory requirements which can under certain conditions restrict the 
free movement of goods. These restrictions may be allowed if they are necessary to “satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the 
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the 
consumer.”162 The four conditions for national measures restricting the four freedoms, 
formulated in Gebhard, require that the measures are applied in a non-discriminatory manner, 
they are justified by “imperative requirements of general interest”, they are suitable for 
achieving the goal pursued, and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.163 Although 
the legal basis for public policy exceptions cannot be covered thoroughly here, there are 
multiple examples in case law which demonstrate the balancing between the free movement 
rights and public policy interests.  
A significant statement regarding social policy aspects was made by the ECJ in Viking Line: 
“Since the Community has thus not only an economic but also a social purpose, the 
rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy, 
which include -- improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while improvement is being maintained, proper social protection and 
dialogue between management and labour.”164 
To use environmental concerns as an example, the ECJ has emphasised that environmental 
concerns may be justified as restrictions of the free movement rights. The ECJ confirmed that 
environmental concerns may be interpreted as a mandatory requirement for the first time in 
Danish Bottles.165 In Inn Valley, the Republic of Austria had prohibited lorries of over 7.5 
 
161 The so-called four freedoms of the internal market are established in Article 26 TFEU. 
162 Although the free movement of goods prevailed in this case, the judgement is significant as it introduced the 
exception of mandatory requirements. The wording ”in particular” suggests that this list is not exhaustive. See C-
120/78, Cassis de Dijon, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, para. 8. 
163 C-55/94, Gebhard, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para. 39. See also C-76/90, Manfred Säger, ECLI:EU:C:1991:33, 
para. 15, which refers to the public interest. 
164 C-438/05, Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, para. 79. For similar notions of the social objectives of the EU, 
see C-341/05, Laval, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras. 104 and 105. 
165 See C-302/86, Danish Bottles, ECLI:EU:C:1988:421, para. 9 and Poncelet 2013, p. 186. 
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tonnes carrying specific goods from using a certain section of a motorway in Inn Valley. The 
measure was argued to ensure better air quality. According to the ECJ:  
“It is settled case-law that overriding requirements of protection of the environment can 
justify national measures that are liable to obstruct intra-Community trade, provided 
that those measures are suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and do not 
go beyond what is necessary for attaining it.” 
Although the measure was considered to go beyond what was necessary to attain the 
environmental objectives in question, the assessment of the ECJ clearly shows that 
environmental and other public policy concerns may be considered as lawful restrictions of the 
free movement rights.166 There are also state aid -related cases, where environmental 
considerations and restrictions to free movement have been considered. In PreussenElektra, the 
ECJ evaluated national legislation promoting renewable energy, stating that the use of 
renewable energy is “useful for protecting the environment in so far as it contributes to the 
reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases which are amongst the main causes of climate 
change which the European Community and its Member States have pledged to combat.”167 
The ECJ also considered environmental aspects in Mickelsson and Roos, where the court 
concluded that national legislation prohibiting the use of jet skis on other than designated waters 
could be justified under certain conditions, as the legislation aimed for the protection of the 
environment.168 
In a more recent and interesting judgement, the ECJ assessed a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment in Article 49 TFEU. The national measure in case was argued to protect the 
freedom and pluralism of the media, protected in Article 11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. According to the judgement, “the safeguarding -- the freedom 
and pluralism of the media, unquestionably constitutes a legitimate aim in the general interest, 
 
166 C-28/09, Inn Valley, ECLI:EU:C:2011:854, paras. 124-125 and 150-151. For cases regarding waste 
management, see e.g. C-203/96, Dusseldorp, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 and C-2/90, Walloon Waste, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:310. 
167 C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, para. 73. 
168 C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, ECLI:EU:C:2009:336, paras. 40 and 44. The same national legislation was 
evaluated later in C-433/05, Sandström, ECLI:EU:C:2010:184. 
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the importance of which in a democratic and pluralistic society must be stressed in particular, 
capable of justifying a restriction on freedom of establishment.”169 
The ECJ has also acknowledged the Union’s objectives set in the Treaties when assessing 
restrictions to the free movement rights. In Inn Valley, for example, the ECJ emphasised “a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”, as well as “a high level 
of health protection”.170 In Laval, the court emphasised the “harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities” and “a high level of employment and of social 
protection.”171 Similarly, the policy-linking clause currently in Article 11 TFEU, requiring that 
environmental policy be integrated into other EU policies, has been noted by the ECJ in its 
decisions.172 This depicts a somewhat holistic interpretation of EU law. 
These examples show that the ECJ interprets the Treaty provisions in a rather holistic manner 
in cases regarding the free movement rights. The possibility of public policy restrictions to the 
freedom of movement rights is especially relevant, considering that it also entails the balancing 
between economic and public policy interests. As will be argued in chapter 4.2.5, the free 
movement rights and competition rules constitute the core parts of the same economic 
constitution, which implies that they should perhaps be interpreted in a coherent manner. 
3.5 Contextual Remarks 
All the cases introduced above, especially ones prior to the modernisation, must be interpreted 
in accordance with the legal atmosphere of that time. As was described in chapter 2.2, the 
modernisation of EU competition law was a significant turning point for public policy 
considerations. Prior to modernisation, the Commission and EU courts have been more open 
towards public policy considerations, especially as regards environmental considerations.173 
For example, the Commission stated in 1995 that “improving the environment is regarded as a 
factor which contributes to improving production or distribution or to promoting economic or 
 
169 Although the national measure was not considered to be appropriate for achieving the objective pursued, 
Vivendi provides a recent example of the court’s interpretation of the four freedoms in relation to other values and 
rights established by EU law. See C‑719/18, Vivendi, ECLI:EU:C:2020:627, paras. 57 and 79. 
170 C-28/09, Inn Valley, ECLI:EU:C:2011:854, para. 120. 
171 C-341/05, Laval, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para. 104. 
172 See e.g. C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, para. 76. 
173 See e.g. Townley 2009, p. 2, Monti 2007, p. 90, and Kingston 2012, p. 38.  
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technical progress.”174 In a decision from 1996, the General Court stated that the Commission 
may consider public interest requirements when assessing an exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.175 After the modernisation of EU competition law, the Commission has demonstrated a 
more restrictive approach towards public policy considerations. The Commission’s General 
Guidelines, for example, seem to focus mainly on cost and qualitative efficiencies.176 
However, the shifts in competition policy have been mainly advocated by the Commission, 
which seems to endorse various objectives more readily than the ECJ. The ECJ has practiced 
more caution in its judgements, which usually emphasise the broader framework of the EU 
Treaties.177 Even after the key developments of the modernisation process, the ECJ has stated 
that the objective of competition rules is “preventing competition from being distorted to the 
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the 
well-being of the European Union.”178 Thus, it is relevant to ask whether the shift in competition 
policy should be accredited mostly to the Commission. 
It could be argued that the pre-modernisation cases have not been rendered irrelevant by the 
more economic approach. Although the legal framework and competition policy has shifted 
towards an efficiency-oriented approach, EU competition law is nevertheless grounded in the 
broader framework of the EU Treaties, which promote other than economic values as well. 
Therefore, a relevant question for public policy considerations is whether competition law 
should promote them in light of the wider Treaty objectives, and how these colliding interests 
should be balanced. Another relevant concern, often expressed by critical commentators, is that 
of legal certainty. 
3.6 The Principle of Legal Certainty 
One of the most significant criticisms towards public policy considerations is concerned with 
legal certainty. The concept of public interest is viewed by many as vague and including public 
policy considerations in EU competition law is feared to increase uncertainty.179 This concern 
 
174 European Commission, XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, para. 85. In contrast, the Commission 
General Guidelines from 2004 make no reference to environmental issues. 
175 Joined cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93, Metropole television, ECLI:EU:T:1996:99, para. 
118. 
176 Ezrachi 2017a, p. 131. 
177 Witt 2012, p. 444. 
178 C-52/09, TeliaSonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para. 22. 
179 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 34. 
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is addressed below, with a focus on the theoretical background of the principle of legal certainty 
and its implications as regards public policy interests. 
The principle of legal certainty is one of the general principles of EU law.180 The principle calls 
for predictability and certainty in judicial decision-making, and one clear aspect of legal 
certainty is the principle of non-retroactivity.181 On a general level, legal certainty is said to 
require precise norm-formulation, judicial review and democratic control.182 Assessing legal 
certainty in the context of the European Union, one should note that the EU courts follow 
teleological interpretation, taking into account the objectives and legal principles of the 
Union.183 
Popelier introduces a dynamic conception of legal certainty, which is construed by stability, 
simplicity and adaptability. This approach describes the balancing between fixedness and 
flexibility, and in legal terms is captured by the requirements of legal expectations and 
accessibility. Adaptability especially promotes the dynamic nature of this approach. If new 
developments of the society create challenges or unforeseen situations, the lawmaker should 
amend laws in order to capture these changes in legal terms.184 When balancing between 
fixedness and flexibility, one should balance legitimate expectations against the general good, 
and consider inter alia how individuals are able to adapt to new rules, how the rules benefit the 
society, and whether the legal amendment was predictable.185 
Raitio’s analysis provides a more nuanced definition of legal certainty:  
“the principle of legal certainty in EC law relates to the principle of non-
retroactivity and the protection of legitimate expectations in particular, but more 
profoundly it can be related to the conceptual scale for weighing up and balancing 
between predictability and acceptability, between formal justice and material 
fairness, in legal decision-making.”186 
 
180 For case law, see e.g. C-13/61, Bosch, ECLI:EU:C:1962:11, p. 52 and C-80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:431, para. 13. 
181 Storey - Pimor 2018, p. 55. The principle of non-retroactivity, on the other hand, is often linked to legitimate 
expectations. See Raitio 2003, p. 129. 
182 Raitio 2003, p. 127. 
183 Raitio 2018, p. 486. 
184 Popelier 2017, p. 37 
185 Ibid., p. 54. 
186 Raitio 2003, p. 387. 
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The conceptual scale is linked to a three-fold definition of legal certainty, which entails a 
metaphorical scale: formal legal certainty, factual legal certainty and substantive legal certainty. 
A predictable decision would emphasise formal legal certainty, whereas acceptability is a 
manifestation of substantive legal certainty.187 In legal argumentation, one should start with 
linguistic interpretation and thus formal legal certainty. If a decision cannot be justified with 
solely linguistic arguments, the next levels of justification should consider conceptual 
definitions and proto-norms, which include legal principles and policies. The other end of this 
scale includes values and political morality, and thus represents a natural law approach.188 
Looking at legal literature, public policy considerations are often viewed as problematic from 
the perspective of legal certainty. A practical argument is that businesses need to understand 
and predict the legal environment where they operate. This argument could be supplemented 
by stating that decreased legal certainty increases legal risks, and the existence of legal risks 
reduces a company’s incentive to innovate and invest.189 This notion is true, yet it is also quite 
paradoxical, as the recent discussion regarding sustainability agreements involves uncertainty 
as to whether companies may invest in a more sustainable business without breaching the 
competition rules – in other words, there is uncertainty regarding whether companies may invest 
in public policy -related goals. Today’s companies might promote sustainability and other goals 
which have earlier been pursued mainly by governments, through public policy initiatives. In 
this sense, the tables have turned, and in some areas, businesses are calling for more guidance 
on whether they can promote goals traditionally viewed as public policy initiatives.190 
One argument promoting public policy concerns would be that law is bound to always include 
some uncertainties.191 Furthermore, the Skanska case demonstrates that the current competition 
rules sometimes create (arguably) unpredictable outcomes, even though the interests in the case 
are purely economic.192 It must be noted, prima facie, that this argument is not that robust, 
although it provides another perspective to the discussion. Legal certainty is surely something 
that should be pursued, notwithstanding that it may never be achieved perfectly.  
 
187 Ibid., p. 373. 
188 Ibid., pp. 368-369.  
189 Townley 2009, p. 33. 
190 See chapter 3.3.3 for further discussion regarding sustainability initiatives. 
191 Townley 2009, p. 33. 
192 See C-724/17, Skanska, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, para. 56 and the discussion in chapter 5.1.2. 
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Continuing on a practical note, the ECJ has stated that the principle of legal certainty requires 
that “legal rules be clear and precise, and aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships 
governed by Community law remain foreseeable.”193 How could legal certainty be ensured 
when it comes to public policy considerations? It is naturally desirable to formulate possible 
rules or exemptions regarding public policy initiatives as clearly as possible. If one could rely 
on clear legal rules and linguistic interpretation, the decision would enjoy formal legal certainty, 
which is surely a favourable starting point. As real-life situations are not always clearly and 
predictably captured by legal measures, the rules or exceptions should also include further 
guidance on which factors are weighed in interpreting these rules. Following Popelier’s notions, 
the rules should, however, remain general enough to capture possibly unforeseeable 
developments.194 
A fundamental issue in this regard is the fact that the ECJ has not given a clear definition of the 
objectives of EU competition law. Terms such as consumer welfare and consumer well-being, 
for example, remain without a clear definition. To cite Bork,  
“Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one 
question: What is the point of the law – what are its goals? Everything else follows from 
the answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by 
several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict in values arises? Only when the issue of 
goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules.”195 
It is true that the current effects -based competition law which utilises economic analysis might 
provide clearer and more predictable benchmarks, thus contributing to formal legal certainty. 
One approach to public policy considerations would be to emphasise the dynamic nature of the 
law. Ezrachi considers that a dynamic competition regime allows it to reflect on its surrounding 
environment and react to societal changes, without losing touch to its “conceptual core”.196 One 
recent example of the dynamic nature of EU competition law is the Commission’s response to 
the Covid-19 crisis. During 2020, the competition framework has been swiftly amended to 
accommodate urgent needs related to the crisis, inter alia by issuing comfort letters and a 
temporary framework allowing a specific type of business cooperation.197 
 
193 C-63/93, Fintan Duff v Minister for Agriculture and Food, ECLI:EU:C:1996:51, para. 20. 
194 Popelier 2017, p. 54. 
195 Bork 1993, p. 50. 
196 Ezrachi argues that dynamism enables competition law to react to a crisis, for example, by loosening the legal 
requirements when necessary. See Ezrachi 2017, p. 67.  
197 See Commission Covid-19 Guidelines 2020. 
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Public policy considerations could be assessed with the two theoretical scales of legal certainty 
presented above, namely Popelier’s scale from fixedness to flexibility and Raitio’s conceptual 
scale from predictability to acceptability. On Popelier’s scale, public policy considerations 
would certainly require some amount of flexibility from the competition framework. 
Emphasising adaptability, i.e. the requirement of reacting to new developments in the society, 
could justify an amendment in the competition framework, which would address rising societal 
issues, such as climate change. As for the scale proposed by Raitio, public policy considerations 
would emphasise acceptability and substantive legal certainty. However, it could be argued that 
public policy considerations could be supported in legal decision-making with conceptual 
definitions and proto-norms as well. This would certainly require a shift in competition policy 
and a recalibration of how different interests are balanced in competition assessment. Finally, 
public policy considerations could be supported with a clear legal framework, which would 
allow for some linguistic interpretation and thus promote formal legal certainty.  
Admittedly, if the goals of competition law become fragmented, it is unlikely that formal legal 
certainty could be satisfied to the same extent as before. However, I do not believe that this 
would undermine the principle legal certainty entirely. Following the theories of Raitio and 
Popelier, legal certainty should be conceived as a scale, and not as a finish line that can only 
be crossed by fulfilling certain (formalistic) requirements. By emphasising the dynamic nature 
of the law, public policy considerations could perhaps be addressed while still respecting legal 
certainty. While the balance on the conceptual scale might slightly shift, I would argue that with 
a clear legal framework, it would not tip the balance to the detriment of formal legal certainty. 
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4 Theoretical Framework to the European School of Thought 
4.1 Economic Theories as Basis for Competition Policy 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Competition law and enforcement is influenced by different underlying economic theories and 
assumptions, depending on the current time and place. Differing views on competition theory 
and competition economics can be categorised into economic schools of thought, although it 
must be emphasised that the schools of thought do not represent identical and uniform views.198 
Changes in economic theories usually affect competition enforcement, though as Monti 
explains it, these changes might very well take a decade to realize.199 The use of different 
economic approaches in U.S. antitrust enforcement can be simplified as follows: in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Harvard school’s SCP model was followed, whereas the Chicago school gained 
popularity in the 1980s. The ideas of the Chicago school’s successor, the post-Chicago school, 
have been applied (somewhat hesitantly) ever since the 1990s.200 The European school was a 
late bloomer in this regard: it was not until the late 1990s that EU competition law started to 
rely on an economic approach that would be known as the European school of thought.201 
Both the Harvard and Chicago schools of thought have had an impact on today’s EU 
competition law. Although both schools originated in the U.S., it could be argued that the 
Harvard approach has retained its impact more within the EU than the U.S. As for the Chicago 
school of thought, it has gained more popularity in the EU through the “more economic 
approach” and a tendency towards effects-based assessment.202  
The following assessment of the various schools of thought and their theoretical backgrounds 
aims to emphasise the unique theoretical framework of EU competition law. Although the 
Harvard school is briefly introduced as well, this assessment gives more emphasis on the 
 
198 Chang distinguishes nine different economic schools of thought: classical, neoclassical, Marxian, 
Schumpeterian, Keynesian, Austrian, institutional and behavioural economics, as well as developmentalism. See 
Chang 2015, p. 116. 
199 To use the U.S. as an example, post-Chicago ideas were on the rise already in the 1980s, yet this approach was 
not considered in antitrust enforcement until the 1990s. See Monti 2007, pp. 73-74. 
200 Ibid., p. 73. 
201 Commissioner van Miert initiated the modernisation of EU competition law, which would ultimately lead to 
“the more economic approach”. The first document promoting the modernisation process was the Green Paper on 
Vertical Restraints, adopted by the Commission on 22 January 1997. See Hildebrand 2016, p. 16. 
202 Kingston 2012, pp. 21-22. 
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Chicago school’s views and their fundamental differences with the European framework. This 
is mainly because the Chicagoan efficiency-focused approach is visible in U.S. antitrust and to 
some extent in EU as well. However, this chapter will emphasise certain views of the Chicago 
school that are at odds with the theoretical foundation of the European school. Ultimately, the 
following assessment aims to argue that the European school of thought forms a distinct 
approach to competition law, at the core of which is the social market economy. This also leads 
us to consider whether competition policy should be reconsidered in light of the social aspect 
of the social market economy. 
4.1.2 Classical and Neoclassical Theories 
Competition law was initially assessed from an economic perspective by classical and 
neoclassical economists. Classical theory, developed in the eighteenth century, was the first 
significant theory concerning competition economics. It was based on the freedom of 
competition and freedom of consumers to choose between alternative products. Adam Smith, a 
prominent name in classical theory, developed the concept of the ‘invisible hand’, which depicts 
the forces of competition that self-sufficiently create efficiency, without the need for 
government intervention.203  
Theorists such as Cournot and Marshall later introduced the use of mathematical formulas in 
competition economics, a branch of theories usually called neoclassical theories. Neoclassical 
theorists developed the widely used and applied theory of perfect competition, which describes 
a market where no market participant has market power, thus creating an environment of perfect 
competition.204 Perfect competition has five conditions: a large number of buyers and sellers, 
homogeneous products, perfect information, free entry and exit to the market, and zero 
transportation costs. The theory states that under conditions of perfect competition, the law of 
supply and demand would work through the equilibrium price, creating both allocative and 
productive efficiency.205  
Although classical and neoclassical theories were able to study the effects of competition in a 
clear way, the theory of perfect competition is nowadays largely held somewhat unrealistic. 
 
203 Hildebrand 2016, p. 94. 
204 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
205 The law of supply and demand was developed by Alfred Marshall, a prominent figure in neoclassical 
economics. See Geradin - Layne-Farrar - Petit 2012, pp. 63-65. 
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This is largely due to the fact that the five conditions of perfect competition hardly ever come 
true.206 The theory is based on a conception of homo economicus, a rational individual who 
makes economic decisions in a somewhat predictable manner. This, as will be demonstrated in 
the next section, is not always true. Furthermore, the theory of perfect competition does not 
capture the dynamic nature of competition.207 However, the theory of perfect competition is of 
great practical importance in competition law, as it is often used by competition authorities to 
study real-world behaviour.208 
4.1.3 Behavioural Economics 
There are multiple economic schools relevant to competition law, but behavioural economics 
is especially relevant as a comparison to the neoclassical homo economicus model. The 
neoclassical approach is based on the rational choice model, which presumes that an individual 
will make choices solely based on individual utility. Thus, the individual will choose an 
alternative that will maximise their self-interest.209 This model has been challenge by a line of 
research, often categorised as behavioural economics. The research in behavioural economics 
has shown that individuals are not always rational: in fact, behavioural economics heavily 
criticises the neo-classical assumption of rational behaviour and self-interest. By including 
psychology in their evaluation, behavioural economists aim to provide a more realistic model 
of human behaviour.210 Kahneman’s theory of human thinking has shown that an individual’s 
decision-making is not always rational and is sometimes affected by notable systematic 
biases.211 
Behavioural economics has been discussed in the competition context as well.212 The reason 
why consumer biases might be relevant for competition analysis is the fact that they question 
the validity of certain economic models used currently. While biases impact individual 
behaviour, this behaviour could be relevant through market demand and thus be of interest in 
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competition cases.213 The juxtaposition between the neoclassical and behavioural economics is 
closely linked to the public policy discussion, since these schools represent differing views. 
While the neoclassical approach believes in rational people and their freedom to act as they 
will, behavioural economists believe that humans cannot be absolutely rational. Thus, they 
suggest that public policy might provide help in making accurate and better decisions.214 In a 
broader picture, behavioural economics has sparked discussion around behavioural policy-
making, which links it not only to the economics aspect of this thesis, but to public policy as 
well.215 
Behavioural economics and behavioural public policy are broad topics worthy of further 
research. In this context, however, I mainly aim to emphasise that the different premises 
underlying different economic theories have a significant impact on how competition is 
perceived and what tools are considered best for analysing it. Continuing on economic 
considerations, another essential element of competition economics is how consumer welfare 
is perceived and measured. 
4.1.4 Welfare Economics 
Despite the common use of the term consumer welfare in competition law, there are several 
conceptions of welfare in competition economics. A noteworthy distinction can be made 
between consumer welfare and total welfare. Total welfare (sometimes referred to as social 
welfare) consists of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consumer surplus means the 
difference between what a consumer is prepared to pay for a product and what they actually 
pay for it. In other words, when the consumer buys the product for a lower price than what they 
were prepared to pay for it, consumer surplus is increased. Producer surplus, on the other hand, 
is increased when a producer is able to sell a product for a higher price than what the production 
cost was. Consumer welfare, as opposed to total welfare, is solely focused on consumer 
surplus.216 
From an economic perspective, welfare is believed to increase with efficient allocation of 
resources. Economic efficiency is generally understood as Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks 
 
213 Oxera 2013, p. 30. 
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efficiency. Pareto efficiency is based on the theory of the free market, which assumes that 
individuals have a freedom of choice to take part in transactions or not. Pareto efficiency is 
reached when an individual’s position cannot be improved without worsening that of another 
individual (Pareto-optimal state). Based on the free market theory, Pareto efficiency is believed 
to increase with each market transaction.217 Pareto efficiency as their basis, Nicholas Kaldor 
and John R. Hicks created a model which is applicable to the law. According to Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency, a change will cause an improvement “whenever the winners consider their gains to 
be greater than the losers consider their losses to be.” This model includes scenarios where 
nobody’s position is worsened, as well as scenarios where one individual’s position is 
improved, and another’s is worsened.218 
4.2 The European School of Thought 
4.2.1 Theoretical Background 
Before the modernisation of EU competition law, EU competition policy was mainly affected 
by ordoliberalism and the Harvard school of thought.219 After the modernisation took place, 
economic analysis has become an essential part of interpreting and applying competition law 
within the European Union. Although economic literature does not usually recognise a 
European school, Hildebrand distinguishes the European school of thought as its own, distinct 
approach to competition economics.220 The European school advocates that the market can only 
thrive, if it is backed by a constitutional framework, which allows for policy considerations 
such as social equality.221 These values are pursued by protecting the competition process and 
ensuring that the benefits of competition are distributed fairly and equally.222 
This chapter will follow Hildebrand’s premise, according to which the European school of 
thought can be distinguished as an independent school of thought. The purpose of this chapter 
is not to deny the influence of other schools of thought, but rather emphasise the sui generis 
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features of the European school of thought, such as the social market economy, and examine 
the fundamental differences it has with the Chicago school. 
4.2.2 Ordoliberalism 
Ordoliberalism has had a fundamental impact on the early development of European 
competition law and policy.223 Ordoliberalism is rooted in the 1930s, when the University of 
Freiburg scholars developed an idea that state intervention is necessary to protect competition 
in the market.224 According to the Freiburg ideas, the market should be tied to a constitutional 
framework, which would guarantee that the profits from a competitive market were distributed 
equally. Even though state intervention was considered necessary, the constitutional framework 
was believed to minimize the need for it.225 As Gerber puts it, ordoliberals were seeking a new 
liberal way between the American West and the Soviet East. They based their ideas on two 
principles of classical liberalism: competition promotes economic well-being, and economic 
freedom is a central value in addition to political freedom. The new wider concept of liberalism 
was based on the idea that individuals had to be protected from not only public, but also private 
power. In practice, this meant the dispersion of both political and economic power, especially 
monopolies.226  
If we take a look at classical and neoclassical theories, some common ground can be found. 
Ordoliberalism agrees on the neoclassical view that individual freedom is best protected by the 
market mechanism. The differences relate largely to the functioning of the market mechanism. 
Whereas classical and neoclassical theories believe in the power of unregulated markets, 
ordoliberalists view that government intervention can prevent the negative effects of the market 
mechanism and thus consider societal concerns as well.227 
According to ordoliberalism, an independent legal system is essential in order to protect 
individual freedom from public and private power. The lack of such a legal framework is 
believed to have contributed to the accumulation of economic and political power in Nazi 
Germany, ultimately assisting the forming of a dictatorship.228 An essential part of 
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ordoliberalism is a constitutional framework that protects the process of competition. The state 
has a crucial role in creating and maintaining competition, as private companies are believed to 
ultimately have the tendency to restrict competition in various measures. As Hildebrand puts it, 
“economic freedom entails the potential for its own distruction.”229 
A central concept to ordoliberalism is the economic constitution, which defines the so-called 
rules of the game under which economic activities occur.230 Ordoliberalists viewed that the 
pursued economic order, one that would promote common interests as well, could be achieved 
by formulating an economic constitution which would support this goal. Vanberg distinguishes 
a theoretical and a policy paradigm in ordoliberalist ideas. The theoretical paradigm operates 
on the premise that the characteristics of the economic constitution should be reflected in 
economic analysis. According to the policy paradigm, the economic constitution (‘the rules of 
the game’) should be developed by economic policy in order to achieve the desired economic 
order. Changes in the economic reality are thus sought by amending the constitutional 
framework, rather than by case-by-case intervention.231 
4.2.3 Social Market Economy 
A distinctive feature of the European school of thought is the social market economy, a 
developed version of ordoliberalism.232 The social market economy can be traced back to the 
EU Treaties. The objectives in Article 3 SEU include inter alia the establishment of an internal 
market and the sustainable development of the EU, which is based on “a highly competitive 
social market economy”. A social market economy combines the idea of market freedom and 
social objectives, such as social equality and social fairness. Hand in hand with these 
objectives, the social market economy aims to distribute wealth equally between all market 
actors, producers and consumers. The state has an active role in protecting the free market 
forces and pursuing social objectives, which the state executes by taking regulatory measures. 
Compared to the Chicago school, the European school thus addresses consumer interests in a 
holistic way that includes broader policy goals and social aspects.233 
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Competition economics in the EU are based on a constitutional, predefined framework, namely 
the Treaties and the objectives which they have determined.234 Out of the relevant competition 
provisions in the Treaties, especially Article 101(3) of TFEU stands out when it comes to the 
equality and fairness aspect. This exemption clause provides that agreements which would 
otherwise restrict competition, can be deemed lawful if it “contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”. This demonstrates the concept of fair 
wealth distribution, which is characteristic of the European school. In contrast, the Chicago 
school does not take a stand on how wealth should be distributed, and thus does not accept the 
predefined framework that is typical for the European school.235 
As mentioned above, the achievement of a highly competitive social market economy is one of 
the objectives set out in Article 3(3) of TEU. The definition of this concept, or the means of 
achieving it, is not entirely unambiguous. The ECJ has not clarified its meaning, and the 
Commission has mostly made rather general remarks of it.236 What is characteristic to the 
concept of a social market economy is the debate between the free markets Europe and the 
social Europe. The debate over the EU’s functions is not new, yet it is still topical, as some 
advocate for a union that focuses on its “core task” of protecting the free market, while others 
argue for a social union that provides social protection. Despite the obvious dichotomy, the two 
should not be perceived as mutually exclusive options. After all, simply the inclusion of the 
term “social market economy” in Article 3(3) of TFEU implies that these objectives are 
compatible.237 
4.2.4 The European Social Constitution and Social Model 
A social market economy combines the ideology of a free market economy with social 
values.238 What does the social aspect entail in a Union that was founded on the idea of 
economic integration? In certain decisions related to the freedom of movement rights, the ECJ 
has emphasized the social sphere of the Union.239 Especially noteworthy in this regard is AGET 
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Iraklis, where the ECJ addressed the issue of balancing social and economic interests. 
According to the Court, “[s]ince the European Union thus has not only an economic but also a 
social purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement -- must be 
balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy, which include, as is clear from the 
first paragraph of Article 151 TFEU, the promotion of employment, improved living and 
working conditions, -- proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the 
development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of 
exclusion.”240 
Some guidance could be sought in European constitutionalism, namely the concept of a 
European social constitution. The Treaty provisions regarding social values and objectives, 
social rights and social policy competences241 suggest that a social dimension could be 
distinguished from the European constitution. The concept of a European social constitution 
has been highly debated, as social welfare is largely a national matter, and the social provisions 
of the Treaties seem rather weak compared to the provisions that form the economic constitution 
of the EU.242 However, Tuori argues that there is a social dimension to the European 
constitution, but it has to be assessed with regard to two characteristics: “the primacy of the 
national welfare state and subordination of the social to the economic constitution”.243 
The “social” in the social market economy could be studied by looking at the European social 
model (ESM), a concept that is discussed more in political rather than legal literature. The ESM 
depicts the relatively new social dimension of the European Union, originally and primarily an 
economic union. Although the Treaty of Rome contained social objectives, the provisions 
lacked practical measures to pursue them.244 Without going into too much detail on the EU’s 
history, the first Social Action Programme in the 1970’s, as well as a social protocol annexed 
to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, were among the significant developments that brought the EU 
towards a social union.245 The ESM was especially advocated in the 1980s as a mutual tradition 
 
240 C‑201/15, AGET Iraklis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:972, para. 77. 
241 See e.g. Articles 2, 3 and 6 TEU, and Title X (Social Policy) TFEU. 
242 Tuori describes the social constitution as a “constitutional underdog”, mentioning that social policy provisions 
do not have direct effect or any monitoring or sanctioning system attached to them, unlike many economic 
provisions. See Tuori 2015, p. 228. 
243 Ibid., p. 229. 
244 Whyman et al. 2012, p. 1. Relevant social provisions of the Treaty include e.g. Article 117 regarding improved 
working conditions, and Article 119 regarding equal pay for men and women. 
245 Whyman et al. 2012, p. 2. 
 
 48 
  
of social protection among EU member states. It has also been argued that the European Social 
Model was an alternative to the social market economy.246 
The ESM is a somewhat vague concept: some authors dismiss the idea of a unified social model 
altogether and instead divide European countries into different welfare models, while other 
authors use the concept of ESM to describe the aspiration of social values in a more abstract 
manner.247 Whyman et al. have developed a threefold definition, which depicts a competitive 
market economy, where social institutions and social solidarity play an integral part.248 
The European Parliament has described the ESM as follows: 
“The European social model is first and foremost a question of values. Whatever 
European social system we examine we find the common values of equality, non-
discrimination and solidarity and redistribution as fundamentals, with universal, 
free or cheap access to education and healthcare, and a variety of other public 
services as the right of a citizen and as essential to creating the basis for a 
successful modern economy and a fair society. It is in this respect that our 
European model differs from the US model for instance.”249 
The ESM can be further described by the criticism it receives from neoliberalist theorists. 
Neoliberalism, which is especially influential in U.S. antitrust policy, has a strong faith in the 
self-regulating markets. According to the neoliberalist approach, the markets will determine 
optimal wages and the level of employment. Intervening the operation of the markets with 
labour regulations, unemployment benefits, or other social measures that aim to support an 
individual in this respect, does not fit the neoliberalist thinking. Such measures could cause 
rigidity in the markets, increase labour costs and discourage work. As a response to the 
neoliberalist approach, theorists supporting the ESM believe that social measures may actually 
benefit the economy. For example, social measures might make it easier for a job applicant to 
find work best suitable for their skills, or to get further education to support their career, which 
ultimately may benefit the society as a whole.250 
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Based on the considerations above, the social aspect of the social market economy seems to 
emphasise labour and social aspects. On the other hand, the Parliament’s definition of the ESM 
is more abstract, relying on values such as equality and redistribution. The juxtaposition of the 
ESM and neoliberalism emphasizes the nature of the European approach and its differences 
with the United States. Using the ESM as an example also demonstrates that the juxtaposition 
between the European and the U.S. approach goes beyond competition law. Although this 
notion might be obvious to some, it is necessary to emphasize in the context of this thesis. The 
wide systematic and ideological differences between the European Union and the United States, 
which will be elaborated in this chapter, further validate the reasoning that certain beliefs of the 
Chicago school do not fit the core of the European social market economy. 
4.2.5 The European Economic Constitution 
The social market economy can also be assessed by distinguishing a European economic 
constitution.251 The term “economic constitution” was developed and mostly used in the 
ordoliberal tradition and is thus not an entirely undisputable concept.252 As was mentioned 
earlier, the economic constitution includes the rules by which economic activities are conducted 
in a society.253 It is formed by principles and norms which guarantee economic rights to citizens 
and businesses and impose obligations to the government. In practice, such provisions 
guarantee inter alia contractual freedom, private property rights, as well as free movement and 
undistorted competition within the internal market.254 
Ordoliberals viewed that the economic constitution was maintained by Ordnungspolitik (order-
based policy), which essentially means a set of policies reflecting the economic order 
envisioned by the economic constitution.255 As part of the Ordnungspolitik, ordoliberals 
envisioned a Ganzheitsbetrachtung, (an integrated policy perspective), according to which 
individual economic decisions were considered in light of the economic constitution as a 
whole.256 A distinction can be made between the micro-economic and macro-economic 
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constitution. Free movement rights and competition law form the core of the micro-economic 
constitution.257 The macro-economic constitution entails monetary policy objectives, the entry 
criteria to the European Monetary Union, as well as national fiscal policy considerations.258  
The concept of an economic constitution within a social market economy has two implications. 
For one, competition law and free movement laws are complementary elements of the same 
system, namely the micro-economic constitution. It could be thus argued that these two sets of 
the same system ought to be interpreted in a coherent manner.259 Secondly, the economic 
constitution forms an integral part of the social market economy. Being a part of the micro-
economic constitution, competition law should thus consider, or at least not contradict, societal 
objectives pursued within the social market economy.260 
4.3 Comparison: U.S. Antitrust Theories 
4.3.1 Background 
The legislative core of U.S. antitrust law concludes of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.261 Antitrust law and policy in the United States is rooted in 
the idea of total welfare, which focuses on efficiencies in total, regardless of who receives the 
created benefits.262 This premise is important to acknowledge as antitrust literature sometimes 
uses the term consumer welfare in a somewhat misleading manner. Bork, who is considered as 
one of the founders of the Chicago school, created the so-called “Chicago trap” by using the 
term consumer welfare when he was in fact referring to total welfare.263  
As this thesis has a European perspective and the comparison to U.S. antitrust only has a 
complimentary role, it should be acknowledged that the “Chicago school’s views” are difficult 
to portray exhaustively due to the scope of this thesis. The Chicagoan scholars are not 
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completely unified in their views, on top of which the antitrust field in the U.S. is divided into 
more widely differing views which can be categorised into e.g. Chicago and Harvard school, 
not to mention the more recent theories which could be called post-Chicago or neo-Chicago 
theories.264 The assessment of the Chicago school will rely largely to the views presented by 
Bork and Posner, since they both had a prominent role as judges, and both presented rather 
comprehensive views on the Chicago school.265 
4.3.2 Harvard School and the SCP Paradigm 
The so-called Structure – Conduct – Performance paradigm is an early idea of Harvard scholars, 
developed in the 1930s. It states that market structure affects a firm’s conduct, and the conduct 
then determines economic performance. Bain, one of the leading scholars of the SPC paradigm, 
believed that most markets were too concentrated. The SCP paradigm thus represented a rather 
strict and interventionist approach to competition law.266 In the Harvard school’s early works, 
Mason suggested that economics should be used to distinguish socially desirable outcomes, 
thus contributing to public policy.267 Even though the Harvard school of thought has its roots 
in the SCP model, its modern version is considered less interventionist.268 
Compared to the Chicago school, the Harvard school’s approach is more structuralist and 
focused more on whether companies have power to restrict competition, not whether they 
actually have the incentive to do so.269 Harvard scholars also emphasise the future dynamic 
effects instead of short-term (allocative and productive) efficiency, the latter representing the 
Chicagoan approach.270 Although many Harvard scholars agree with the efficiency approach, 
their main disagreement with the Chicago school is about whether the markets are self-
correcting or not.271 
 
264 To provide an example of this, there is debate in U.S. literature as regards what the legislators of the Sherman 
Act actually intended to promote as the objective of antitrust law, consumer or total welfare. See Dameron 2016 
and Heyer 2006, p. 12. 
265 For a similar approach, see Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 305. See also Hildebrand 2016, p. 23. 
266 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 14. The SCP paradigm can also be used to describe the differences of Chicago 
and Harvard scholars, as both schools of thought interpreted the SCP paradigm in their own way. Whereas Harvard 
scholars would have condemned concentration in a certain market, Chicago scholars viewed that said 
concentration could be caused by significant efficiencies that undertakings with a large market share receive. See 
Geradin - Layne-Farrar - Petit 2012, p. 73. 
267 Mason 1937, p. 49. 
268 Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 14. 
269 See Evans - Padilla 2005, p. 76 and Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 303. 
270 Kuoppamäki 2003, p. 29. 
271 Ibid., p. 121. 
 
 52 
  
The Harvard school has had considerable impact on the development of EU competition law. 
For example, the role that market shares and the Herfindahl– Hirschmann Index play in EU 
merger control, demonstrate a Harvard approach.272 In Metro, the ECJ referred to the 
maintenance of workable competition, a theory characteristic of the Harvard school.273 The 
General Court has also stated that competition law aims to protect market structure, another 
essential element to the Harvard approach.274 
4.3.3  The Chicago School 
The loudest critics of Harvard school’s SCP model were Chicago scholars, whose alternative 
model ultimately had a profound impact on competition law.275 The General Dynamics and 
Sylvania cases are considered to have marked a turning point for the Chicago school. In General 
Dynamics276, the Supreme Court raised the threshold for prohibiting horizontal mergers, and in 
Sylvania277, the formerly negative attitude towards exclusive retail agreements shifted into a 
more allowing direction.278 
The Chicago school’s approach is rooted in neoclassical price theory.279 The minimalist 
approach of the Chicago school argues that the markets will correct themselves, thus indicating 
that government intervention should remain minimal.280 The Chicagoans thus focus on the 
functioning of the markets and not on competition itself. State intervention is considered 
harmful, unless it will almost certainly increase consumer welfare.281 
The Chicagoans believe that antitrust policy should only focus on economic efficiencies. 
Therefore, there is no room for social considerations in the Chicago school.282 In fact, Posner 
has stated somewhat straightforwardly that “[e]fficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust.”283 
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Bork’s definition of efficiency includes both allocative and productive efficiency. According to 
his definition: 
“business efficiency necessarily benefits consumers by lowering the costs of 
goods and services or by increasing the value of the product or service offered.”284 
Judge Posner has affirmed the efficiency approach in a judgement by the Court of Appeals in 
1986, where he stated that: 
“as the emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as 
a process of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting 
economic efficiency [--] it became recognized that the lawful monopolist should 
be free to compete like everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be 
holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors.”285 
According to Bork, the goal of antitrust is consumer welfare.286 The protection of “small 
merchants”, i.e. inefficient competitors, does not fit the Chicagoan idea of consumer welfare.287 
The Chicago school rejects the idea of redistribution of wealth (which represents a consumer 
surplus model) and  instead promotes a total surplus model. The arguments supporting total 
welfare are mainly linked to the belief that the growth of the overall economy generates more 
wealth in total, and that any remaining wealth distribution issues may be solved through 
taxation or other governmental measures. Bork and Heyes also argue that if redistribution is 
based on the lesser or poorer position of consumers as opposed to producers, it would be 
difficult to determine this factor, not to mention that the assumption itself is problematic.288 
These ideas are in clear contradiction to the European school’s principle of equal distribution 
of wealth. 
The discussion on goals of antitrust is not entirely consistent or unified in the U.S., but the 
predominant ideas promote a so-called laissez-faire approach.289 As for the role of judges and 
courts, Bork considered that they should not deduce market power simply from market shares 
(except for very high market shares). Furthermore, Bork viewed that judges should not evaluate 
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so-called trade-offs, i.e. how to distribute economic surplus between consumers and 
producers.290 This is closely linked to the Chicagoan belief that false positives are costlier than 
false negatives.291 
Despite the Chicago school’s popularity in legal literature, the Supreme Court has not yet 
confirmed whether total welfare is the goal of U.S. antitrust or not. In light of case law, the 
question of welfare standards thus remains unclear.292 An interesting finding is presented by 
Bradford et al., who argue that the Chicago school’s influence worldwide is not as widespread 
as many would think.293 
4.3.4 Post-Chicago and Neo-Chicago 
Geradin et al. suggest that Chicago and Harvard schools represent two extremes on the spectrum 
of normative competition economics. To simplify, Harvard school saw an issue with all 
concentrated markets, whereas Chicago school was ready to assume all monopolies and 
oligopolies to be efficient.294 The Post-Chicago school is situated somewhere between these 
two extremes, representing a more nuanced approach that acknowledges certain market 
imperfections and includes industrial organisation and game theory in its approach.295 
In his assessment of the post-Chicago school, Hovenkamp acknowledges that post-Chicago 
scholars have successfully found that “the number and variety of anticompetitive practices are 
unknown and open ended, particularly in relatively new markets --“.296 Ironically, Hovenkamp 
finds that post-Chicago’s weakness lies in the complexity of the market. An economic model 
that is too complex to administer will lead to more errors in the courts and make it difficult for 
legislators to formulate rules that properly represent such intricate theories.297 
 
290 Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 306.  
291 False positives are “type 1” errors which mean that lawful conduct is mistakenly condemned, whereas false 
negatives, “type 2” errors occur when anti-competitive conduct is not captured by antitrust enforcement. See 
Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 306 and Barnard - Peers 2014, p. 516. 
292 Hildebrand 2016, p. 31. 
293 This empirical study also suggests that an increasing amount of scholars are criticising the Chicago school for 
the current state of U.S. antitrust law, which in their opinion needs revising. See Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 
2020, p. 329. 
294 Geradin - Layne-Farrar - Petit 2012, p. 74. 
295 The post-Chicago school’s influence increased in the 1990s and 2000s, although the Chicago school’s ideas 
still had relevance in case law. See Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 304. 
296 Hovenkamp 2001, p. 268. 
297 Ibid., p. 336. 
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Neo-Chicago is a later approach that agrees on the Chicago school premises but considers the 
criticism and insights that Chicago and post-Chicago schools have received.298 Many view that 
Neo-Chicago is not even a new school, but rather a developed version of the Chicago school. 
The vast discussion around different schools of thought has even led to meta-discussion on the 
labels that different schools are given. Many view that the labelling of different schools of 
thought leads to a too stark distinction between them, and ultimately gives a distorted and 
simplistic idea of the development of the U.S. antitrust system.299 For the purposes of this thesis, 
different schools of thought have an essential role in depicting the nature of EU competition 
policy. Even though it is useful to acknowledge the simplistic nature of these “labels”, the 
ideologies and the historical context of the different schools of thought are useful for assessing 
public policy considerations in relation to the European school of thought. 
4.4 Fundamental Differences Between the Chicago and European School of Thought 
The economics of the Chicago and European school can be assessed on a strategic, operational 
and tactical level. The strategic level represents the guidelines by which economic analysis is 
applied in practice, on the operational level. On the strategic level, a logical starting point is the 
market concept applied. The market concept is common ground for the Chicago and European 
schools, which is defined by Hildebrand as follows: 
“Competition among firms to obtain the backing of consumers spurs firms to 
produce these goods and services that are most highly valued by consumers at the 
lowest possible cost.”300 
What fundamentally separates these two schools on the strategic level is distributional 
considerations. In the EU, the redistribution of wealth is predetermined by the legal framework 
of the social market economy, which requires that the benefits of the market are distributed 
equally. The Chicago school, on the other hand, dismisses such a normative approach. Chicago 
scholars are also opposed to the European belief that the competitive process itself should be 
protected by government intervention.301 
 
298 Evans - Padilla 2005, p. 75. 
299 See e.g. Jones - Sufrin - Dunne 2019, p. 21; Kovacic 2007, p. 8-9; and Wright 2012, p. 271.  
300 Hildebrand 2016, p. 23. 
301 Ibid., p. 23. 
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The differences on the operational level are derivative of those on the strategic level. In the 
European school’s approach, economic analysis on the operational level must comply with the 
framework of the social market economy, i.e. the premises on the strategic level. Economic 
analysis in the Chicago school is not affected by such predefined objectives, especially as 
regards the rule of reason approach, which is characteristic of U.S. antitrust law.302 The 
European school and Chicago school thus have fundamental differences on the strategic and 
operational level. The tactical level is rather universal in economics, and therefore similar for 
both schools of thought.303 
On a practical level, the Commission’s approach to competition law does have some common 
ground with the Chicago school’s views. The Commission’s assessment of horizontal mergers 
seems to include elements of neoclassical theory, although the different welfare standards 
applied may impact the outcome of merger assessment significantly.304 Certain elements of the 
Commission’s approach may prima facie seem to depict Chicagoan views, for example in 
believing that a dominant position is not illegal per se, and that many anti-competitive conducts 
may be counterbalanced with efficiencies.305 However, the Commission is much less lenient 
when it comes to monopolies and vertical agreements, as well as vertical or conglomerate 
mergers.306 
Finally, the fact that the Commission must consider the single market objective and consumer 
surplus in its assessment, creates a fundamental difference between these two.307 Despite the 
way that the EU has embraced economic analysis since the modernisation phase in the early 
2000s, EU competition law remains essentially different from U.S. antitrust law.308 The 
approach in EU competition law can be described as “maximalist”, compared to the Chicago 
school’s minimalism.309 
I believe that the European school’s background situates EU competition law in a 
fundamentally different framework, which is mostly reflected in the Treaties. To some extent, 
this “unique” framework is visible in competition enforcement as well, but I would argue that 
after the more economic approach, this framework has faded especially in the Commission’s 
 
302 Hildebrand 2016, p. 24. 
303 Economic analysis on the tactical level is used to describe data and market facts. See Hildebrand 2016, p. 24. 
304 Bartalevich 2016, pp. 272-273. 
305 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
306 See Bradford et al. 2019, p. 436 and Bartalevich 2016, p. 276. 
307 Whish - Bailey 2018, p. 23 and Hildebrand 2017, p. 8. 
308 Bradford et al. 2019, p. 436. 
309 Bradford - Chilton - Lancieri 2020, p. 312. 
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decisions. This might be due to the Chicago school’s popularity, but I would emphasise that the 
European school ought to be assessed as its own distinct school of thought. This premise also 
supports the view that public policy considerations should be analysed in the context of the 
European social market economy, and its distinct features. 
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5 A Holistic or an Isolated Approach to Competition Policy? 
5.1 Coherence 
5.1.1 Coherence in Legal Theory 
Looking at the EU’s “constitutional” provisions310, one notices that EU has a wide range of 
goals. Article 3 of TEU mentions inter alia the well-being of people, sustainable development, 
and improvement of the quality of the environment as the Union’s goals. Article 7 of TFEU 
requires the EU to “ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its 
objectives into account”. Furthermore, environmental protection requirements are specifically 
addressed by Article 11, which states that such requirements “must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in particular with a view 
to promoting sustainable development.”311  
What is the role of competition law in relation to these constitutional provisions? It could be 
argued that competition law cannot isolate itself from the constitutional provisions. Kingston 
and Gerbrandy have aptly pointed out that the Treaty system does not set the various objectives 
of Article 3 of TEU in any hierarchical order.312 The question of whether competition rules 
should be viewed separately or in context of EU-wide objectives is closely related coherence, 
an idea of a unified and consistently systemised legal system.313 Citing Townley,  
“This dispute, between those that read the competition rules in isolation and those 
that read the Treaty holistically, goes to the very heart of Treaty interpretation. It 
affects everything, from the substantive interpretation of individual provisions to 
the facility with which the Treaty can be applied, procedurally. Its resolution is 
vital for determining whether, in Article 81 cases, the Community decision-maker 
should be guided ‘by one value or by several’ goals.“314 
 
310 The Founding Treaties of the EU are often perceived as the constitution of EU. For example, the ECJ has 
described EU law provisions as the EU’s constitution. See Rosas - Armati 2018, p. 1-5.  
311 The same requirement can be found in Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
312 Kingston 2012, foreword; and Gerbrandy 2019, p. 137. 
313 Coherence is widely discussed in legal theory. For notions of coherence in the doctrinal study of law, see Aarnio 
2011, p. 145-146. 
314 Townley 2009, p. 3. 
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Why is coherence relevant? Tuori considers that coherence is essential for forming a rational 
argument. To that end, coherence is inner consistency within the argument.315 Sauter gives a 
threefold definition to coherence: the first two requirements are logical consistency and the 
forming of a unified and systematic whole. The third element combines the first two 
requirements, stating that they should “serve a clearly identifiable objective and/or set of 
principles”. Sauter emphasizes that the goals of EU competition law are central for coherence, 
as the third requirement is closely linked to the teleological and goal-centred approach of the 
EU courts.316 
Coherence is also linked to legal certainty. If normative coherence, the rationality of a single 
judicial decision, is viewed from a broader perspective, one needs to consider formal justice. 
Formal justice, or formal equality in the administration of justice requires that similar cases are 
decided in a similar manner, and vice versa. Formal justice guarantees legal certainty and 
predictability, thus connecting coherence to these principles.317 
To give yet one more thought on the bigger picture, legal systems can be studied with legal 
dogmatic theories and reflexion theories. Legal dogmatic theories promote consistency in 
applying law, whereas reflexion theories view the law from an internal perspective. Reflexion 
theories ultimately aim to reflect on the identity of a legal system and portray the legal system 
as one whole unity.318 According to Tuori, the unity of law has been described with two 
alternative lines of theory. On one hand, the legal positivist approaches of Hart and Kelsen trace 
the unity of law back to the hierarchy of norms.319 On the other hand, Dworkin and Habermas 
argue that the unity of law is linked to the coherence of principles. Habermas considers that 
human rights and rule of law principles form the normative deep structure of modern law.320 
Dworkin’s theory is based on law as integrity. This theory assumes that “propositions of law 
are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due 
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice”.  
The adjudicative principle of integrity “instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so 
 
315 Tuori 2007 p. 123. 
316 Sauter 2016, p. 9. 
317 Tuori 2007, p. 124. 
318 Ibid., p. 121. These two theories were originally distinguished by Niklas Luhmann. 
319 Kelsen’s theory is based on the basic norm (Grundnorm), which is the foundational norm in his hierarchical 
system. Hart explains law with the rule of recognition. See Hart et al. 2012, p. 101-102 and Tuori 2007, p. 122. 
320 Tuori 2007, p. 122.  
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far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author – the community 
personified – expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness”.321 
MacCormick’s normative coherence contains similar elements, as it argues that coherence is 
created by a consistent set of values and/or principles. The laws of a legal system should, 
according to MacCormick, be justified by these higher values and principles, which ultimately 
promote a satisfactory way of life.322 
According to Tuori, coherence can be total or local. Total coherence aims for the unity of the 
legal system as a whole, whereas local coherence is a narrower conception describing 
coherence within a certain area of law. He considers EU law as an independent legal system, as 
the totality of it would be rather difficult to fit into the systemizations of national laws.323 Tuori 
examines the systemisation of the legal system into different areas of law, stating that the 
traditional areas of law are no longer capable of creating coherence in the modern, fragmented 
and pluralist (national and supra-national) law. Instead, coherence in the modern society could 
be achieved with principles which create unity.324 When different principles are balanced in 
judicial decision-making, the general principles of the legal culture become surface-level 
norms, which form the basis for construing the decision norm of the case at hand.325 
5.1.2 Coherence in European Union Law 
The writings of Sauter and Soriano are especially interesting since they study coherence from 
the EU’s perspective, Sauter concentrating on EU competition law. Sauter makes a distinction 
between external and internal coherence. External coherence puts competition law in the 
context of European integration and the EU as a whole, and thus seems to correlate with Tuori’s 
total coherence. Internal coherence has two subcategories. Type A internal coherence covers 
the system of EU competition law, whereas type B internal coherence includes enforcement 
and judicial review.326 
 
321 Dworkin 2000, p. 225. 
322 MacCormick considers that there is “extensional equivalence” between values and principles, stating that 
“values are the product of a system of practical principles”. See MacCormick 1984, p. 41, 53. 
323 Tuori 2007, p. 120. 
324 Ibid., p. 122. 
325 Tuori views that coherence can be demonstrated through the three levels of law: the surface level, legal culture 
deep structure. On the surface level, the coherence of legal norms is secured by legal principles, which are rooted 
in the legal culture or deep structure. Thus, Tuori considers legal norms to be coherent when they represent similar 
or compatible principles. These principles uphold inner consistency, and coherence. See Ibid., pp. 123-125. 
326 Tuori’s local coherence seems to correlate with type A internal coherence. See Sauter 2016, pp. 9-10. 
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Sauter views external coherence mainly from the perspective of the internal market, which he 
aptly describes as “the motherload of EU law”.327 Sauter thus does not seem to argue for or 
against internal or external coherence – instead of an either/or approach, he depicts a concept 
of coherence, where both an external and internal perspective coexist as separate viewpoints. 
Compared to Tuori, he seems to narrow the concept of external coherence so much that it may 
coexist with internal coherence and is more achievable than Tuori’s conception of total 
coherence. Furthermore, Sauter links effectiveness and legitimacy to coherence, stating that one 
should be able to evaluate EU competition law based on the underlying legal principles of the 
EU legal system as a whole.328 
Soriano, on the other hand, makes a distinction between coherence in the legal system and 
coherence in legal reasoning. Coherence in the legal system aims to create consistency between 
all features of the legal system. In legal reasoning, coherence should be pursued through 
consistent arguments.329 Soriano views that these two types of coherence are interwoven. 
Coherence in legal reasoning creates structures or chains of arguments which support the 
coherence of the legal system.330 
Soriano argues that coherence can be understood as “base-dependent and pluralistic”, in a way 
that makes sense of the diversity of law without distorting it. Instead of trying to create a 
tensionless system based on a single unifying set of principles principle, this approach accepts 
the plurality of values and the complexity of law and legal reasoning.331 Soriano’s arguments 
are based on the notion that that ECJ’s decisions sometimes involve a conflict between 
“incommensurable goods”, such as environmental protection and economic freedom. As such 
conflicting values cannot be evaluated with similar measures, legal arguments are used to justify 
a rational choice between the conflicting values.332 
Soriano’s model seems nuanced and is by nature different from the total/local theories of 
coherence. Soriano views that such theories correlate with her notion of coherence in the legal 
 
327 Sauter 2016, p. 258. 
328 Ibid., p. 261. Sauter also views this as an element of external coherence. 
329 Soriano 2003, p. 297. 
330 Although Soriano does not deny the significance of coherence in the legal system, her theory is focused on 
legal reasoning. See Soriano 2003, p. 300. 
331 Soriano 2003, p. 302. 
332 Ibid., p. 297. Sauter’s theory is significantly different in this regard. According to him, balancing between 
different values (for example, when state aid is allowed for national environmental policy reasons) creates 
inconsistency. See Sauter 2016, p. 260. 
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system, but neither are about coherence in legal reasoning.333 Coherence in the legal system 
could thus be compared to total coherence or external coherence, whereas coherence in legal 
reasoning would perhaps correlate with Sauter’s type B internal coherence, but not with local 
coherence. Soriano’s approach is quite different from Dworkin’s, which seems to pursue a 
unified, globally coherent system, where values (or principles) do not collide.334 
One line of arguments considers that law has become instrumentalised, meaning that it is used 
to pursue certain socio-political goals. When legal norms implement varying goals that are 
dependent on the shifting political environment, coherence becomes impossible to achieve.335 
Coherence could be deemed significant for competition policy, as consistency is essential for 
creating legitimate and effective policies.336 Sauter views public policy exceptions especially 
problematic for coherence, noting that public policies separate state aid and sectoral 
competition policy from other areas of competition law.337 A counterargument to this is based 
on Dworkin’s distinction between principles and policies. Policies pursue the socio-political 
goals described above, legal norms do not. Legal principles connect law with moral aspects and 
create coherence.338 Dworkin’s counterargument could be further supported by Soriano’s 
insights on balancing between different values with rational legal argumentation. 
A linkage to legal certainty and the rule of law can be found in Raitio’s argumentation. Raitio 
emphasises the balance (or imbalance) between the principle of effectiveness on one hand, and 
legal certainty and rule of law on the other.339 The principle of effectiveness is ultimately rooted 
in the internal market goal, whereas legal certainty and the rule of law are inalienable principles 
of the sovereign member states, situated in the deep structures of law. The balancing between 
such different principles is thus problematic.340 Raitio argues that the ECJ has given emphasis 
on the principle of effectiveness especially in cases regarding economic continuity.341 
 
333 Soriano 2003, p. 305. 
334 Ibid., p. 304. 
335 Tuori 2007, p. 127. 
336 Sauter 2016, p. 260. 
337 Ibid., p. 259. 
338 Dworkin 2000, p. 223-225. Dworkin has received criticism from Posner 2006. 
339 Raitio 2019, p. 59. The principle of effectiveness in this context does not refer to effective competition, but to 
an EU-wide principle, according to which national procedural law cannot make it impossible to enforce rights 
based on EU law. See C-33-76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral v Landwirtschaftskammer, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, para. 5 and C-106/77, Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, para. 22. 
340 Raitio 2019, p. 65. 
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The tension between effectiveness and legal certainty is visible in Skanska, the so-called asphalt 
cartel case. One of the questions referred to the ECJ was whether the concept of undertaking is 
defined in accordance with public enforcement cases, applying the principle of economic 
continuity.342 The ECJ emphasised that “the right to claim compensation for damage caused by 
an agreement or conduct prohibited by Article 101 TFEU ensures the full effectiveness of that 
article” and concluded that the concept of undertaking has to be interpreted in accordance with 
the imposition of fines.343 Weighed against legal certainty, the ECJ argued that it can restrict 
the rights guaranteed by the effectiveness principle only in exceptional circumstances.344  
According to Advocate General Wahl’s opinion, a similar interpretation of the concept of 
undertaking in public and private enforcement is rational, since both public and private 
enforcement have the same function: “to deter undertakings from engaging in anticompetitive 
behaviour.” Wahl also argued that “public and private enforcement of EU competition law 
together form a complete system of enforcement, albeit with two limbs, that should be regarded 
as a whole.”345 In addition to emphasising the principle of effectiveness, Wahl’s argumentation 
seems to support local coherence, i.e. coherence within EU competition law. In fact, the 
decision seems rational in the context of local coherence.  
When it comes to balancing effectiveness with legal certainty, the ECJ’s argumentation seems 
to put notably more weight on effectiveness, since legal certainty was only considered to form 
a narrow exception in this case. Considering that these principles stem from fundamentally 
different dimensions of the legal system, Soriano’s idea of coherent legal reasoning could 
perhaps provide some stability to such balancing. Effectiveness and legal certainty could in 
certain cases be perceived as incommensurable principles which cannot be measured by the 
same metrics, and thus rational legal argumentation could justify a decision between these two. 
It would be premature to draw conclusions based on one specific case, but the Skanska decision 
certainly demonstrates the tension between the principles of the EU, and provides an interesting, 
practical perspective to the question of coherence. 
 
342 C-724/17, Skanska, ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, para. 22. 
343 Ibid., paras. 43 and 47. 
344 According to the Court, “it is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle 
of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict, for any person concerned, the opportunity 
of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established 
in good faith.” See Ibid, para. 56. 
345 Wahl also described public and private enforcement to be complimentary and to constitute “composite parts of 
a whole”. See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in C‑724/17, Skanska, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paras. 76 and 80. 
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5.1.3 Coherence Through the Constitutional Articles of the Treaties 
Returning to the constitutional provisions of the Treaties, a relevant question is whether 
competition law should contribute to the wide range of objectives set in the Treaties. On the 
surface, the argument of total coherence seems appealing. After all, why should one area of EU 
law be completely isolated from certain objectives that are at the very core of the Union? On a 
more practical level, can all of the EU’s objectives be efficiently pursued, if the various policies 
are not designed to support each other? A more comprehensive assessment of coherence shows 
that the question is bound to be complex in an extremely multidimensional legal system such 
as the EU.  
The assessment above has demonstrated the widespread discussion around coherence. It is 
clear, that coherence can be explained with varying theoretical structures and viewed from 
different perspectives. Coherence in law is often argued to be achievable through a set of 
principles expressing common values or objectives.346 Despite the varying views on how 
coherence in the legal system should or could be achieved, most scholars seem to agree that 
coherence in legal decision-making is important.347 This is especially true for Soriano, as her 
theory is centred around coherence in legal reasoning. On a more practical level, consistency in 
EU law could be pursued with “clear objectives, boundaries, rules, exceptions, procedures, and 
remedies, as well as the application of general principles of EU law.”348 Sauter points out that 
the ECJ has not provided a coherent approach as regards EU competition law’s objectives 
(especially consumer welfare), and exceptions such as public policy interests. The single market 
objective, on the other hand, does create coherence as it has been consistently promoted in the 
ECJ’s decisions.349 
Another argument stems from political science and is focused on good governance. A system 
that pursues multiple policy objectives will function more efficiently, if the various objectives 
are acknowledged in all parts of governance. This argument relies on coherence, which is an 
 
346 For example, Tuori seems to dismiss the possibility of total coherence and considers that it is possible to pursue 
local coherence through general doctrines. He recognises that coherence can be viewed from an internal or an 
external perspective, both representing differing views on coherence. See Tuori 2007, p. 131. 
347 Tuori views this to be essential for the principles of formal justice, predictability and legal security. See Tuori 
2007, p. 310 and UN Report on the Fragmentation of International Law (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), para. 
491. 
348 Important legal principles, according to Sauter, include “effectiveness and equivalence, pre-emption, 
proportionality, and -- the rights of the defence.” See Sauter 2016, p. 258. 
349 Sauter 2016, p. 263-264. 
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essential part of good governance theory.350 Good governance is not only a theoretical ideal but 
a concrete objective set in the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, according 
to which the EU must start “establishing more coherence in its policies so that it is easier to see 
what it does and what it stands for.”351 From this perspective, isolating competition policy from 
e.g. environmental concerns could be regarded to go against principles of good governance.352 
5.1.4 Coherence and Public Policy Considerations 
The policy-linking provisions in the Treaties, namely Articles 7 and 11 TFEU, send a clear 
message: EU policies should support each other, and especially environmental policy, including 
sustainable development, should be integrated in the Union’s policies and activities. These 
articles seem to promote total coherence, yet many scholars view such a multitude of values to 
erode coherence within EU law. To conclude, one line of arguments seems to disapprove of the 
instrumentalised use of policies, and instead prefers to rely on legal principles, such as 
effectiveness and proportionality, to create coherence. I agree with this line of arguments to the 
extent that consistent application of key legal principles of EU law will surely promote formal 
justice and legal certainty, especially at the level of judicial decision-making and legal 
reasoning. 
However, this notion alone might not capture the various values which Article 3 TEU, for 
example, includes. Using MacCormick’s approach as a premise, laws are justified by higher 
values and principles, which ultimately promote a satisfactory way of life. I would argue that 
peace, well-being, justice and equality, among the other goals of Article 3 TEU, ultimately 
promote a satisfactory way of life and to that end, could create coherence. Furthermore, the 
objectives set in the Treaties are rather permanent and much less instrumental compared to 
policies. 
 I agree with Soriano’s notion of colliding values, and consequently find Dworkin’s idea of a 
single, unifying set of principles, difficult in the context of the EU. The various objectives of 
the EU will occasionally collide as it is quite difficult to balance values such as economic 
freedom and environmental concerns (or, as the Skanska case demonstrates, legal principles 
such as effectiveness and legal certainty). Past cases have shown that such collisions are 
 
350 Kingston 2012, p. 126. 
351 Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428, p. 1. 
352 Kingston 2012, p. 126. 
 66 
  
inevitable, and to that end I agree with Soriano’s theory of pluralistic coherence. Rational legal 
reasoning can justify a choice between incomparable interests, although it requires a clear set 
of goals, rules and exceptions to support it. I believe that a situation where no such collisions 
occurred, would only create ostensible coherence on the level of legal decision-making. Such 
an “ideal” situation could only be achieved by dismissing certain values altogether, which 
seems problematic to say the least. 
To conclude, some notions on coherence could be made based on the theories studied above. 
On a somewhat abstract and fundamental level, laws are justified by values and principles 
which promote a satisfactory way of life, and simultaneously create coherence. One way of 
interpreting this premise is to consider Article 3 TEU to reflect these values. Applying legal 
principles of the Union in a consistent way will promote formal justice and predictability. When 
certain principles, values or objectives collide, rational legal reasoning can be used to justify a 
choice between colliding interests.  
Finally, the theme of this chapter – whether competition law should be applied in a holistic or 
an isolated manner – is a question of total or local coherence. I would consider local coherence 
a logical starting point, as it would seem illogical to compulsively pursue total coherence at the 
expense of individual areas of law. However, I would argue that total coherence should not be 
dismissed merely because it seems impossible to achieve. Although in some instances it seems 
that one should choose between total or local coherence, I am inclined to believe that both could 
be pursued simultaneously. As mentioned earlier, the uncertainty regarding the objectives of 
EU competition law is somewhat of an obstacle in this regard. Setting clear objectives for 
competition law would promote to the pursuit of both total and local coherence. 
5.2 Consumer Welfare in a Social Market Economy 
5.2.1 Distributing the Fair Share of Benefits 
Considering public policy issues more widely in competition law might require some type of 
recalibration of the way consumer welfare is measured. The predefined distribution of wealth, 
as dictated in Article 101(3) TFEU, is assessed in this section from two perspectives. Firstly, 
the requirement of “fair share of benefits to consumers” is evaluated by asking whether benefits 
to the whole society are beneficial for individual consumers. Secondly, this idea is further 
developed by considering long-term benefits to consumers and the society. 
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Consumer welfare is not mentioned in the EU treaties, not even in the competition provisions. 
Starting from a clean slate, so to speak, consumer welfare should be assessed in light of the 
Treaties. Holmes argues that assessing the goals of competition law (and the definition of 
consumer welfare) should be based on the Treaties and their constitutional provisions.  This 
premise leads to the conclusion that there also other than simply economic considerations to be 
taken into account in EU law, and thus EU competition law.353 In other words, this approach 
calls for total coherence in the interpretation of consumer welfare. 
One way to assess a more holistic interpretation of consumer welfare is to assess whether 
benefits to the society could generate benefits to the consumers within the meaning of Article 
101(3). A recent, concrete example of such an interpretation can be found in the Dutch 
competition authority’s sustainability guidelines. According to the guidelines, Article 101(3) 
TFEU can be interpreted by weighing societal benefits against the harm suffered by consumers. 
Especially environmental damage agreements may be allowed due to the benefits they bring to 
the society, but in certain cases it is required that the benefits to society outweigh the 
disadvantage to consumers (the end-users of the product at hand).354 Another significant 
consideration in this regard is the counterfactual: if a sustainability agreement is prohibited, the 
society as a whole might suffer from the environmental impact, whereas a potentially small 
group of consumers would reap the benefits.355 
Another way to re-evaluate the fair share of benefits is to assess the temporal dimension of 
consumer welfare. In this regard, it is central to ask whether consumer welfare is measured in 
short-term price effects only, or if competition assessment could take into consideration the 
long-term effects to social welfare. There seems to be some room for considering long-term 
effects under the current regime.356 However, assessing long-term effects is in general viewed 
as difficult.357 Another relevant question is how much weight long-term or short-term effects 
are given, and how they are balanced against each other. This is especially relevant for 
sustainability considerations, since sustainability agreements between undertakings might lead 
 
353 Holmes 2020a, p. 1-3. 
354 ACM draft guidelines on sustainability agreements, paras. 41-42. 
355 Snoep 2020. 
356 For example, assessing Article 101(3) TFEU could involve long-term considerations. In merger control, 
assessing innovation requires a long-term perspective. See Commission General Guidelines 2004, paras. 44, 58, 
92 and Commission Merger Guidelines 2004, para. 38. 
357 Holmes 2020c, p. 36. 
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to short-term price increases, although they could achieve significant societal goals on the long 
run.358 
A few explicit examples of long-term effects can be found from case law. In British Airways, 
the General Court assessed an abuse of dominant position and concluded that competition law 
is focused on “protecting the market structure from artificial distortions because by doing so 
the interests of the consumer in the medium to long term are best protected.”359 Another type of 
example can be found from BPCL/ICI and ENI/Montedison, which are restructuring agreements 
exempted by the Commission on grounds of Article 101(3) TFEU. In both cases, the 
Commission concluded that allowing the restructuring agreement would bring long-term 
benefits to consumers, since it would allow the parties to finance new investments as well as 
research and development.360 
In PreussenElektra, Advocate General Jacobs considered the balance between economic and 
environmental interests as follows: 
“harm to the environment, even where it does not immediately threaten - as it often does - 
the health and life of humans, animals and plants protected by Article 36 of the Treaty, may 
pose a more substantial, if longer-term, threat to the ecosystem as a whole. It would be hard 
to justify, in these circumstances, giving a lesser degree of protection to the environment 
than to the interests recognised in trade treaties concluded many decades ago and taken over 
into the text of Article 36 of the EC Treaty, itself unchanged since it was adopted in 
1957.”361 
Although PreussenElektra is about the free movement of goods and not competition law, it is 
still relevant to the extent that it balances economic interests with environmental protection. 
The possibility of assessing long-term effects is especially relevant for environmental 
protection, as climate change is ultimately a long-term challenge. One rather straightforward 
but appealing (and accurate, in my opinion) argument for environmental considerations is 
 
358 See e.g. ACM analysis in Chicken of Tomorrow. ACM/DM/2014/206028, p. 8. 
359 T-219/99, British Airways, ECLI:EU:T:2003:343, para. 264. 
360 See IV/30.863, BPCL/ICI, para. 36 and IV/31.055, ENI/Montedison, para. 33. It must be noted that these so-
called crisis cartels are a rather specific example situating in an exceptional time and environment. 
361 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2000:585, para. 232. 
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presented by Simon Holmes: “First, we have to apply the law as set out in the treaties. If that is 
difficult, so be it.”362 
5.2.2 Consumer Well-Being 
The discussion around consumer welfare could be widened to a question of whether consumer 
welfare should be interpreted more widely, as consumer well-being.363 The concept of 
consumer well-being is not entirely new to EU competition law. Well-being is, in fact, one of 
EU’s goals mentioned in Article 3(1) of the Lisbon Treaty.364 Commissioner Vestager has stated 
that “[t]he strongest incentives remain consumers’ demand and competitive markets. These are 
the main factors that push companies to bring new products and services to the market, create 
wealth, and improve our well-being.”365 
The ECJ has referred to well-being in competition cases multiple times. In Hoescht, the Court 
of Justice gave the following statement:  
“The function of [competition] rules is, as follows from the fourth recital in the 
preamble to the Treaty, Article 3(f) and Articles 85 and 86, to prevent competition 
from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual 
undertakings and consumers.”366  
In Roquette Frères, the court stated that competition rules aim to ensure “economic well-being 
in the Community.”367 In TeliaSonera, a more recent case from 2011, the court gave an almost 
identical description: 
“[t]he function of those rules is precisely to prevent competition from being 
distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and 
consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union.”368 
 
362 Holmes 2020c, p. 36. A similar notion has been made by Commissioner Kroes: “we cannot just wash our hands 
of responsibility and say that competition law cannot or should not protect the consumer against negative 
medium to long-term effects just because it is difficult to assess.” See Kroes 2005. 
363 Wasastjerna 2019, p. 185. 
364 According to Article 3(1), “[t]he Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” 
365 Vestager 2015b. 
366 Joined Cases C-46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para. 25. 
367 C-94/00, Roquette Frères, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, para. 42. 
368 C-52/09, TeliaSonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 22. 
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A noteworthy difference between these last two cases is that in TeliaSonera the court excluded 
the term ‘economic’ and simply referred to the well-being of the European Union. Another 
significant case in this regard is Österreichische Postsparkasse, according to which “the 
ultimate purpose of the rules that seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal 
market is to increase the well-being of consumers.”369 
In legal literature, consumer well-being refers to a concept broader than consumer welfare. 
Consumer well-being is argued to entail multidisciplinary values and to require the 
accommodation of social, political and moral values.370 Despite the ECJ’s notions of well-being 
in case law, it seems that the Commission has over time begun to utilise the term consumer 
welfare, which is by nature a narrower concept. Consumer well-being is a broad, somewhat 
abstract term, whereas consumer welfare seems to be more economically oriented.371 
Well-being is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “the state of being happy, healthy, or 
prosperous”.372 The OECD Well-being Framework divides wellbeing into two categories. 
Material conditions include income and wealth, work and job quality and housing. Quality-of-
life factors include health, knowledge and skills, subjective well-being, environmental quality, 
safety, social connections, civic engagement and work-life balance.373 It is noteworthy that 
material conditions, i.e. economically measured factors, cover less than half of the various 
dimensions of the well-being framework. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of well-being in the European context, I have 
compared several different language versions of the word “well-being” in three different 
contexts: Article 3(1) TFEU, Österreichische Postsparkasse374 and TeliaSonera375. 
  
 
369 Joined Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151, para. 115. 
370 See e.g. Wasastjerna 2019, p. 185 and Stucke 2012, p. 595. 
371 Ezrachi 2018, p. 5. 
372 “Well-being”, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. 
373 OECD: How's Life? 2020: Measuring Well-being 2020, p. 20. 
374 Joined Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151, para. 115. 
375 C-52/09, TeliaSonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 22. 
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Language 
version 
Article 3(1) TEU 
Österreichische 
Postsparkasse 
TeliaSonera 
English well-being well-being well-being 
Finnish hyvinvointi hyvinvointi hyvinvointi 
Swedish välfärd välbefinnande välståndet 
German Wohlergehen Wohlergehen wirtschaftlichen Wohl 
French bien-êtr bien-êtr bien-êtr 
Spanish bienestar bienestar el bienestar económico 
 
Looking at the first two sources, the translations of well-being are otherwise similar except for 
the Swedish variables välfärd and välbefinnande. All language versions can be translated 
roughly as well-being, except for the Swedish word välfärd, the meaning of which is closer to 
welfare. The German, Spanish and Swedish language versions in TeliaSonera, on the other 
hand, depict a more economically oriented concept of well-being. Wirtschaftlichen Wohl and 
bienestar económico are translated quite clearly as economic well-being, and välståndet could 
be translated as welfare or prosperity.376 
In more recent case law, the General Court has made references to TeliaSonera in CK Telecoms 
and Servier SAS. In both judgements, the language versions listed above contained the same 
words as in TeliaSonera, thus depicting a more economically oriented conception of well-
being.377 Based on the language versions studied above, it thus seems that the judgements of 
EU courts have over time given a more economically oriented interpretation of well-being 
within competition law. This could be a logical consequence of the more economic approach 
and thus a way to distance competition law from the more general notion of well-being in 
Article 3(1) TEU. On the other hand, the more economically oriented translations of well-being 
could be intended to by synonymous with consumer welfare. Despite the slight nuances in the 
different translations of well-being, I would argue that well-being, as expressed in Article 3(1) 
TEU is of the essence in this regard. 
 
376 Translated with MOT Kielipalvelu. Dictionaries used: MOT Pro English (“well-being”), MOT Pro Swedish 
(“välfärd”, “välbefinnande”, “välståndet”), MOT German (“Wohlergehen”, “Wirtschaftlichen Wohl”), MOT 
French (“bien-êtr“) and MOT Spanish (“bienestar”, “bienestar económico”). 
377 T-399/16, CK Telecoms, ECLI:EU:T:2020:217, para. 93 and T-691/14, Servier SAS, ECLI:EU:T:2018:922, 
para. 238. The language versions were similar with the exception that in CK Telecoms, the German translation was 
not available. 
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Studying the U.S. antitrust regime, Stucke argues that “competition policy in any democracy 
with reasonable pluralism cannot be reduced to a single, well-defined goal.” He considers that 
the U.S. has failed in pursuing a single economic goal. Pursuing well-being requires that 
competition policy balances economic, social, political and moral objectives.378 The rationale 
for pursuing well-being has is closely linked to the research of happiness, a topic discussed in 
various disciplines from psychology to economics and jurisprudence.379 Happiness research has 
shown that economic benefits increase well-being only to a certain extent.380 Using OECD’s 
categorisation, material factors increase overall well-being especially in developing countries, 
where increases in economic wealth are needed to cover very basic needs. However, once 
people can satisfy their basic needs, an increase in material factors does not increase well-being. 
In countries with higher living standards, overall well-being is said to increase more by focusing 
on quality-of-life factors.381 
Combining public policy considerations with the concept of consumer well-being provides a 
new angle to the idea of non-competition goals in competition law. If the objective of consumer 
welfare was understood more widely as consumer well-being, competition law could aim to 
improve both material and quality-of-life conditions. Multiple aspects of the OECD’s well-
being framework could be considered as public policy interests as well. Certain material factors, 
such as work and job quality, could be pursued through employment policy. Many quality-of-
life factors, such as knowledge and skills, health and environmental quality, could be translated 
into public policies as well. If public policy interests were pursued through consumer well-
being, public policy considerations could be understood not only as an exception or a restriction 
to the application of competition rules, but as a goal of competition law, which reflects a 
broader understanding of consumer welfare. I acknowledge that this approach poses significant 
practical difficulties, but at least on a theoretical level provides a new perspective to public 
policy considerations. 
A more modest approach would be to introduce quality-of-life factors to the competition rules. 
There are already suggestions on regarding sustainability as non-price factor that may lead to 
improved quality, more innovation and more choice.382 Another alternative is to assess quality-
 
378 Stucke 2012, p. 624. 
379 Ibid., p. 2578. 
380 Life satisfaction tends to rise at low levels of income, but once GDP per capita exceeds $12,000, life satisfaction 
only increases little or not at all. See Kahneman 2006, p. 1909. 
381 Of course, material factors are a pre-condition for promoting well-being through quality-of-life factors, and 
thus an important aspect of well-being in the big picture. See Stucke 2013, p. 2626. 
382 Volpin 2020, p. 13. 
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of-life factors in the interpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU. This might require that the 
economic requirements for this exemption are loosened, or that the conception of fair share of 
benefits is broadened to include certain benefits to the society. 
Although there are no clear and easy tools for promoting consumer well-being, the literature 
and research regarding well-being and happiness provide sound reasons for pursuing them. To 
quote a popular idiom, money cannot buy happiness (after a certain threshold of economic 
welfare, at least). From this perspective, promoting overall well-being through public policy 
goals is not simply a romanticised and abstract goal, but is based on well-founded reasoning. 
In the context of competition law, the crucial starting point is defining the goals of competition 
law. Returning to the ECJ’s argumentation in TeliaSonera, competition rules are stated to 
protect not only individuals and undertakings, but also the public interest, and overall the well-
being of the European Union.383 Furthermore, if our understanding of well-being has improved 
with happiness research, should we not interpret well-being accordingly? 
5.3 Balancing Economic Efficiency with Public Policy Considerations 
5.3.1 Competition Theory from a Contextual Perspective 
Economic analysis is often considered as a stable and reliable way of assessing competition 
matters. However, economic theories are not unambiguous. They are inherently linked to the 
time and place at where they exist and could thus be described as context-bound.384 
Furthermore, there is no single “almighty” economic theory that would fit any economy at any 
given time. Chang, for example, distinguishes at minimum nine different schools of thought. It 
can also be argued that economics is ultimately not a value-free science. In this sense, economic 
theories differ significantly from natural sciences.385 As Kuoppamäki has noted, the important 
question is not whether economic theory is applied or not, but whose economic theory is 
applied.386 As chapter 4 demonstrated, there are lively debates about different economic 
theories and their strengths or weaknesses, as well as their applicability to competition law. 
This discussion in itself describes the nature of economic theories. 
 
383 C-52/09, TeliaSonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 22. 
384 See e.g. Chang 2015, p. 52, Stucke 2012, p. 609 and Hildebrand 2016, p. 90. 
385 It should be noted that neo-classical theorists argue economics to be value-free. See Chang 2015, p. 113-114. 
386 Kuoppamäki 2003, p. 102. 
 
 74 
  
On a practical note, econometric models may lead to differing results depending on how they 
are configured and applied in practice.387 Furthermore, the excessive use of economic analysis 
may not always be the best solution in terms of effective enforcement of competition law. 
Advocate General Kokott brought this out in Post Danmark II, stating that “the added value of 
expensive economic analyses is not always apparent and can lead to the disproportionate use of 
the resources of the competition authorities and the courts, which are then unavailable for the 
purposes of effectively enforcing the competition rules in other areas.” She also emphasised 
that corporate data is often subject to differing interpretations and is not always reliable.388 
A certain degree of contextuality can also be seen in competition law and the way in which 
competition economics are applied. Hart describes law as a social construct that reflects its 
social, political and cultural environment and the values of said jurisdiction.389 Competition 
economics, and the tools chosen to assess competition may thus vary depending on the 
country.390 Consumer welfare and efficiency are good examples of concepts that are common 
in competition law language, but in practice are interpreted and applied in different ways, 
depending on the jurisdiction or legal culture in question.391 
Ezrachi metaphorically portrays competition law as a sponge that absorbs the political, social 
and cultural realities surrounding it.392 Economic considerations are a “membrane” surrounding 
and limiting the absorbent qualities of the sponge, and thus stabilising competition law.393 
However, this membrane should not be considered as static and unchanged. If the qualities of 
the membrane, i.e. the economic theories regarding competition, change, consequently one 
would assume that this would also affect the absorbent qualities of the sponge, and ultimately 
which surrounding realities are addressed in competition law, if any. 
I do not intend imply that economic theories should not be used in competition law. On the 
contrary, I acknowledge that economic theories provide useful insights on how the economy 
operates, and different econometric models offer useful tools and benchmarks for competition 
 
387 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, C‑265/17 P, UPS, ECLI:EU:C:2018:628, para. 39. 
388 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, C‑23/14, Post Danmark II, ECLI:EU:C:2015:343, paras. 66 and 67. 
389 Hart - Bulloch - Raz 1994, p. 116. 
390 One might point out that this may not serve the global sphere of competition law, which could benefit from the 
global convergence of competition rules. However, Fox argues that within the “kaleidoscope of antitrust”, 
differences between jurisdictions ought to be respected and instead focus on developing conflict resolution rules 
to overcome such issues. See Fox 2002, p. 602-603. 
391 Ezrachi 2017b, p. 61. 
392 Ibid., p. 51. 
393 Ibid., p. 59. 
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analysis. What I wish to emphasise with the contextual remarks on economic theory and 
competition law is the notion that competition law (as law in general) is bound to change over 
time. One possible example of this is the notion of non-economic or non-competition 
objectives. What we consider to be non-economic is based on the assumption that we are 
incapable of measuring a certain value in economic terms. Sustainability is one example in this 
regard: it is often considered a non-economic interest, yet it has been suggested that many 
aspects of sustainability could be measured in economic terms.394 From a broader perspective, 
what we conceive as a competition-related goal is also dependent on our conception of 
competition and the economic theories beneath it. Similarly, if current economic analysis is 
incapable of measuring certain values that are considered relevant for competition policy, 
should we not at least discuss alternative ways of measuring them? 
5.3.1 Plurality of Values vs. Efficiency 
The plurality of values in EU competition law can be understood through the goals of 
competition law, or more broadly as the wider values of the European Union. From the 
perspective of competition law per se, the ECJ has emphasised that competition rules aim to 
protect “not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to 
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.”395 On a broader level, the ECJ 
has stated that the competition rules aim to “prevent competition from being distorted to the 
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the 
well-being of the European Union.”396 The ECJ has thus given a rather broad interpretation of 
the objectives of competition law. 
The values and objectives of the Union are by no means merely political or ideological notions. 
The ECJ has referred to the constitutional articles of the Treaties in Viking Line and Laval, both 
cases where the court aimed to emphasise the social dimension of the Union.397 These cases 
and a closer look at the constitutional provisions of the Treaties support the view that 
multidisciplinary values could be considered in competition law without amending the 
 
394 See the discussion in chapter 3.3.3. 
395See C‑8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para. 38 and Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, 
C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. 
396 C-52/09, TeliaSonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 22. 
397 C-438/05, Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, para. 79 and C-341/05, Laval, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras. 104 
and 105. 
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Treaties.398 A challenging question in this regard is whether these values should be considered 
in competition law, and how they should be balanced against colliding interests. 
From a holistic perspective, it could be emphasised that the EU is a Union of multiple values 
and objectives, on some occasions overlapping or colliding. Fitting public policy considerations 
into the framework of competition rules would promote to the pursuit of the wider goals and 
values of the EU but would simultaneously pose certain challenges as to how to balance 
between these objectives. From the perspective of competition law, another relevant question 
is how such wider objectives can co-exist with the efficiency goal of competition law. In other 
words, can non-economic or non-competition goals promote economic efficiency in some way, 
or can the benefits from such objectives prevail over the economic benefits in some cases? 
The emphasis on economic efficiency in competition law ultimately depicts the effects-based 
assessment, which gained popularity after the modernisation of EU competition law. Thus, 
considering the wider values and objectives of the Union in competition law also entails a shift 
of emphasis from a solely effects-based approach to a more holistic approach, which considers 
objectives as well. Whether such a hybrid approach is possible, entails questions that go to the 
very core of competition law. 
 
 
 
  
 
398 Gerbrandy 2019, p. 137. 
 77 
  
6 Conclusions 
 
My research question, introduced in the beginning of this thesis, concerns the role of public 
policy considerations in EU competition law, especially from the perspective of the European 
school of thought. This topic covers multiple different dimensions and themes, out of which I 
have aimed to recognise and analyse the most central ones. A primary issue I have ran into 
during my research is that the objectives of EU competition law remain somewhat unclear. A 
central notion in this regard is the dichotomy between the Commission and the ECJ. Although 
the Commission has actively developed competition law and embraced the effects-based 
approach, it seems that the ECJ has neither accepted nor refused this approach explicitly. 
Studying various public policy considerations with case law and legal literature demonstrated 
the wide policy shift which the modernisation of EU competition law has initiated. Several 
judicial decisions from the “old” competition regime support the premise that public policy 
considerations are possible within the current Treaty framework. It is relevant to note that some 
decisions from that time received heavy criticism, partly due to the growing demand for 
economic analysis in competition enforcement. Now that economic analysis is a central part of 
competition analysis, I believe it is necessary to consider how economics could contribute to 
the discussion around public policy considerations. Sustainability is a recent example of an area 
where economic analysis could be utilised, and thus the notion of public policy considerations 
does not always have to entail a choice of whether economic analysis should be dismissed to 
accommodate other interests. The questions of evaluating certain public policy considerations 
in economic terms, as well as practical research on accommodating public policy interests in 
competition law, are interesting questions that could only be considered to a very limited extent 
in this thesis. Thus, the practical implications and solutions would both constitute relevant and 
timely topics for further research. 
As for the European school of thought, a central notion is that EU competition law is embedded 
in a framework that is fundamentally different from the Chicago school of thought. I studied 
EU competition law through its own, distinct school of thought, due to its unique characteristics. 
One of these characteristics is the social market economy: a system that combines a free market 
with social aspects, such as social equality and social fairness. The objective of establishing a 
social market economy in Article 3 TEU suggests that competition law should perhaps address 
societal concerns as well. This is partly supported by the view that competition law forms a 
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core part of the micro-economic constitution, which is a product of the social market economy. 
Admittedly, if we look at Article 3 TEU more broadly, it envisions the establishment of a highly 
competitive social market economy. In this regard I acknowledge that competition law is mainly 
about competition, and the suggested public policy considerations cannot undermine 
competition altogether. 
The concept of the social market economy, together with Article 3 TEU and Articles 7 and 11 
TFEU, suggest that the theoretical foundations for considering public policy interests in 
competition law exist. A further argument in support of this notion can be found from theories 
of coherence. Although total coherence is considered by some as challenging, or even 
impossible, I consider it to be worth pursuing. A comparison to another core element of the 
economic constitution, namely the freedom of movement rights, has shown that competition law 
is interpreted in a more isolated manner when it comes to public policy considerations. I 
consider it relevant to note that even in cases regarding the freedom of movement rights, a 
fundamental element of the European Union, public policy considerations may constitute an 
exception. Interpreting the two main elements of the micro-economic constitution consistently 
would contribute to total coherence. 
Another perspective in my research was whether consumer welfare and the fair share of the 
benefits could be re-evaluated in light of the objectives expressed in Article 3 TEU. As 
consumer welfare has not been explicitly accepted as an objective by the ECJ, I find that it is 
all the more relevant to assess it. Sustainability is yet again a recent example of how competition 
rules may be interpreted in a more holistic manner. Interpreting the benefits received by the 
whole society as benefits that on the long run benefit individual consumers as well, is integral 
in order to accommodate truly long-term concerns, such as the climate change. I also considered 
consumer well-being as an alternative benchmark, which could capture a broader range of 
values than consumer welfare. Despite the practical difficulties it might pose, it is interesting 
to note that happiness research suggests a rather holistic approach to well-being, one that 
consists of mainly other than economic benefits. 
To conclude, the question of public policy considerations in EU competition law is ultimately 
a question of including fundamental values and objectives of the Union in competition law and 
policy. It is a question of whether competition law should focus solely on the effects of certain 
conduct, or whether it should include broader considerations regarding the objectives of 
competition law, perhaps even the objectives of the Union. I believe that competition law could 
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serve other than solely economic objectives, partly because it seems somewhat unsustainable 
that competition law could be interpreted in total isolation from the rest of the EU law. I 
recognise that economic analysis has become an essential and useful tool for competition 
analysis, but it is relevant to consider whether the plurality of values and objectives in the EU 
could coexist with the effects-based approach. 
A hybrid approach combining the effects-based approach and wider objectives of the Union 
would require substantial practical research to support these theoretical notions. A few practical 
notions can be made in this context. Accommodating public policy considerations in 
competition law is most likely clearer, when new rules or exceptions are created to address a 
certain area of public policy or a specific objective, such as sustainability. In this manner, 
competition rules do not have to include a “vague” notion of public policy considerations, the 
content of which might be unpredictable. Furthermore, the balancing of colliding interests, such 
as economic freedom and environmental protection, should be supported by guidelines or other 
measures which contribute to legal certainty and predictability. 
